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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences are central 
to economic explanations of addiction, but have received little attention in the experimental 
economic literature on substance use. We conduct an incentive-compatible experiment 
designed to elicit the atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk 
preferences of a sample of student (n = 145) and staff (n = 111) smokers, ex-smokers, and 
non-smokers at the University of Cape Town in 2016-2017. We estimate a structural model 
of intertemporal risk preferences jointly with a rank-dependent utility model of choice under 
atemporal risk and a quasi-hyperbolic model of time preferences. We find no substantive 
differences in atemporal risk preferences according to smoking status, smoking intensity, and 
smoking severity, but do find that time preferences have an economically significant 
association with smoking behaviour. Smokers discount at a far higher rate than non-smokers, 
and ex-smokers discount at a level between these groups. There is also a large, positive 
relationship between smoking intensity and discounting behaviour that has important 
implications for treatment. The intertemporal risk preferences of our sample exhibit 
significant heterogeneity and we find, contrary to the assumption employed by some 
economic models, that smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. Instead, 
our sample is characterised by high levels of intertemporal risk aversion which varies by 
smoking intensity and smoking severity in men, but not in women. 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
⌘ Department of Risk Management & Insurance and Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR), 
Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, USA (Harrison); School of Economics, University of 
Cape Town, South Africa (Hofmeyr, Kincaid); School of Sociology, Philosophy, Criminology, Government, 
and Politics, University College Cork, Ireland, School of Economics, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 
Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk, Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, USA 
(Ross); and Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, USA 
(Swarthout). Harrison is also affiliated with the School of Economics, University of Cape Town. E-mail 
contacts: gharrison@gsu.edu, andre.hofmeyr@uct.ac.za, harold.kincaid@uct.ac.za, don.ross931@gmail.com 
and swarthout@gsu.edu. We are grateful to the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa for 
funding this research; in all other respects the funder had no involvement in the research project.
 -1- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic models of addiction highlight the importance of atemporal risk preferences, 
time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences for the onset, persistence, and resolution 
of addiction. The relevance of these preferences in the context of addiction is clear: the 
consumption of addictive goods occurs under conditions of risk and uncertainty (atemporal 
risk preferences); it involves an intertemporal trade-off between current benefits and future 
costs (time preferences); and there is serial correlation in addiction outcomes given that 
present consumption tends to increase the marginal benefit of future consumption while 
simultaneously increasing the risk of a decline in long-term welfare (intertemporal risk 
preferences). 
 
Despite the theoretical importance of these preferences, they have received little 
attention in the experimental economics literature on addiction. Harrison, Hofmeyr, Ross and 
Swarthout (HHRS) [2018] review the experimental literature on atemporal risk preferences, 
time preferences, and smoking behaviour, and find that most studies use inappropriate 
statistical methods and/or preference elicitation mechanisms that lack incentive compatibility. 
Furthermore, we know of no experimental studies that analyse the relationship between 
intertemporal risk preferences1 and addiction. 
 
Intertemporal risk aversion refers to any aversion to variability of outcomes over time, 
just as atemporal risk aversion refers to any aversion to variability of outcomes at a point in 
time. Smoking addictions are often associated with multiple attempts to quit, usually 
successfully for a short period of time, accompanied by eventual relapse. It is precisely this 
canonical profile of a smoking addict that interacts with attitudes to risk over time. Measures 
of risk attitudes at a point in time logically need have no relation at all with risk attitudes over 
time. Hence it is critical to differentiate these two measures of risk attitudes to see if risk 
attitudes in general play a role in explaining smoking behaviour. 
 
                                               
1 The literature on intertemporal risk preferences emerged from the literature on multi-attribute utility theory 
(see Keeney and Raiffa [1976] for a review). A multi-attribute utility function captures the idea that agents may 
take into account the multiple characteristics or attributes of a good when making choices. For example, suppose 
someone wants to purchase a dishwasher and cares both about the speed with which it finishes its cycle and its 
energy efficiency. One machine may be very fast but energy inefficient while another is slower but more 
efficient. To represent the person’s preferences over these different attributes one could employ a multi-attribute 
utility function. In the context of intertemporal consumption streams, the times at which different goods or 
amounts of money are received can be regarded as distinct attributes or characteristics of the consumption 
stream. Viewed in this way, preferences over intertemporal consumption streams are modelled naturally using a 
multi-attribute utility function. 
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We evaluate an incentive-compatible experiment designed to elicit the atemporal risk 
preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences of a sample of student (n = 
145) and staff (n = 111) smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers at the University of Cape 
Town (UCT) in 2016-2017. We adopt the full information maximum likelihood statistical 
approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] to estimate a structural model of 
intertemporal risk preferences jointly with a rank-dependent utility (RDU) model of 
atemporal risk preferences, due to Quiggin [1982], and a quasi-hyperbolic (QH) model of 
time preferences, due to Phelps and Pollak [1968] and Laibson [1997]. We also estimate a 
range of alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results. 
 
Our research makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we replicate the 
finding of HHRS that atemporal risk aversion does not differ according to smoking status and 
smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day, while extending 
this null result to a measure of smoking severity, the Fagerström [2012] Test for Cigarette 
Dependence. Second, we replicate the finding of economically and statistically significant 
differences in the time preferences of smokers and non-smokers and add nuance to this result 
by incorporating ex-smokers in the sample: ex-smokers discount at a level between smokers 
and non-smokers. Third, we identify a positive relationship between smoking intensity and 
discounting behaviour that makes it harder for heavier smokers to quit because the long-term 
costs of continuing to smoke and the long-term benefits that result from successful abstention 
are discounted heavily. Finally, we identify significant heterogeneity in intertemporal risk 
preferences but find, contrary to the assumption employed by some economic models of 
addiction, that smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk-seeking behaviour. Instead, our 
sample is characterised by intertemporal risk aversion, which does not differ significantly 
according to smoking status, but does differ according to the smoking intensity and smoking 
severity of men. 
 
Section 2 discusses the theory of intertemporal risk preferences and their importance 
in economic models of addiction. Section 3 describes our experimental design and presents 
summary statistics for the sample. Section 4 outlines our statistical approach for jointly 
estimating atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences, 
along with measures of smoking behaviour. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. THEORY 
 
HHRS conduct a detailed review of the literature on atemporal risk preferences, time 
preferences, and smoking behaviour so we limit the discussion to the relationship between 
intertemporal risk preferences and addiction. 
 
Intertemporal risk preferences are determined by properties of the intertemporal 
utility function. Consider the following intertemporal choice model: 
 
UU(x0,	x1, x2, …) = E &θ'(Dt
n
t=0
u(xt))* , (1)  
where u(xt) is the atemporal utility function over money at time t, Dt > 0 is a discount factor 
for time horizon t, and θ is the identity function when U(･) is additively separable, but we 
allow for departures from this assumption below.2 
 
Richard [1975] is credited with introducing intertemporal risk preferences to the 
economic literature, although the concept apparently first appeared in de Finetti [1952]. 
Richard [1975] basically extended the notion of risk preferences over one variable to risk 
preferences over multiple variables and referred to the latter as multivariate risk aversion.3 
 
To flesh out this idea, Table 1 includes two intertemporal lotteries (A and B) that 
yield outcomes in two time periods. Under intertemporal lottery A, you flip a coin and if it 
lands on heads you receive $50 today and $5 in 14 days, but if it lands on tails you receive $5 
today and $50 in 14 days. By contrast, under intertemporal lottery B, you flip a coin and if it 
lands on heads you receive $50 today and $50 in 14 days, but if it lands on tails you receive 
$5 today and $5 in 14 days. The outcomes in intertemporal lottery A are negatively serially 
correlated whereas the outcomes in intertemporal lottery B are positively serially correlated. 
  
                                               
2 The expectation E(･) in (1) typically denotes a probability-weighted average, but to incorporate the possibility 
that decision makers subjectively distort objective probabilities, we use E(･) to denote a decision-weighted 
average, in the terminology of RDU theory.  
3 Researchers in the field of intertemporal risk preferences typically employ the risk averse component of these 
preferences in their terminology. Keeney [1973] uses the term “conditional risk aversion,” Richard [1975] refers 
to “multivariate risk aversion,” Epstein and Tanny [1980] define “correlation aversion,” Strzalecki [2013] 
employs “long-run risk aversion,” and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] use “intertemporal risk 
aversion” or “intertemporal correlation aversion.” We prefer the term “intertemporal risk preferences” because it 
does not presuppose an aversion to lotteries with positive serial correlation.  
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Table 1 
Intertemporal Lotteries and Intertemporal Risk Preferences 
State of nature Probability 
Intertemporal 
Lottery A 
Intertemporal 
lottery B 
  $50 today $50 today 
Heads 0.5 and and 
    $5 in 14 days $50 in 14 days 
  $5 today $5 today 
Tails 0.5 and and 
    $50 in 14 days $5 in 14 days 
 
If a decision maker chooses intertemporal lottery A over intertemporal lottery B this 
is evidence of intertemporal risk aversion because, as Richard [1975, p. 12] remarked, “… 
the decision maker prefers getting some of the ‘best’ and some of the ‘worst’ to taking a 
chance on all of the ‘best’ or all of the ‘worst.’”4 If the decision maker is indifferent between 
the lotteries, she is intertemporally risk neutral, and if the decision maker prefers 
intertemporal lottery B to intertemporal lottery A this is indicative of intertemporal risk 
seeking behaviour. 
 
Richard [1975] shows that the sign of the cross partial derivatives of the intertemporal 
utility function determines preferences toward serially correlated lotteries. Specifically, if 
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) ≤ 0 in (1) the decision maker is intertemporally risk averse. In words, if the 
intertemporal utility function’s cross partial derivative is non-positive then the decision 
maker prefers lotteries where the outcomes are negatively serially correlated because the 
marginal utility of current consumption is decreasing in past consumption. By contrast, if 
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) = 0 the decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral, whereas if  
∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) ≥ 0 the decision maker is intertemporally risk seeking. Thus, the form of a 
decision maker’s intertemporal utility function determines her intertemporal risk preferences, 
just as the form of a decision maker’s atemporal utility function determines her atemporal 
risk preferences under expected utility theory (EUT).5 Critically, the sign of ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) 
has no formal or economic connection to the sign of ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-12) or ∂2U(x)/(∂xt2). 
                                               
4 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018, p. 538] provide another intuitive definition for intertemporal 
risk aversion when drawing an analogy between atemporal risk aversion and intertemporal risk aversion: “The 
[intertemporally risk] averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs across periods, just as the 
[atemporally] risk averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs within periods.” 
5 Much as the literature on choice under atemporal risk has evolved to incorporate rank and sign dependence, as 
has the literature on intertemporal risk preferences (see Fishburn [1984] and Miyamoto and Wakker [1996]). 
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The standard model of intertemporal choice in economics employs an additively-
separable intertemporal utility function, so that θ(･) is the identity function in (1). Additive 
separability implies intertemporal risk neutrality because consumption at different points in 
time is independent, so the cross partial derivatives of the intertemporal utility function are 
necessarily zero. Thus, even though a decision maker may be risk averse, risk neutral or risk 
seeking over atemporal lotteries, an additively-separable intertemporal utility function yields 
intertemporal risk neutrality.6 Economic models of addiction abandon the additive-
separability assumption to incorporate intertemporal dependencies in the consumption of 
addictive goods so it is important to understand the implications of this departure from the 
standard model for the intertemporal risk preferences of decision makers. 
 
The first well-known economic model of addiction was developed by Becker and 
Murphy (BM) [1988]. This model assumes that agents consume addictive and non-addictive 
goods, where consumption of the former increases the decision maker’s stock of addictive 
capital. The model also assumes that the agent’s intertemporal utility function is not 
additively separable over time in the addictive and non-addictive goods, because their 
marginal utilities are influenced by the decision maker’s stock of addictive capital. In other 
words, current consumption of an addictive good is affected by past consumption of the 
addictive good through changes in a person’s stock of addictive capital. Specifically, the BM 
model assumes that higher consumption of the addictive good in the past raises the marginal 
utility of present consumption, implying that the more the addict has consumed, the greater 
the benefit from consumption now. This is a necessary condition for the addictive good to 
capture the property of reinforcement, i.e., greater past consumption leads to greater present 
consumption. The sufficient condition for reinforcement is that the benefits from 
consumption now must offset the harmful effects which accumulate over time. When these 
necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied, adjacent complementarity holds, which 
means that consumption of the addictive good is a complement, rather than a substitute, 
across time periods.7 This assumption was central to  economic models of addiction in the 
                                               
6 The fact that an additively-separable intertemporal utility function yields intertemporal risk neutrality has the 
unfortunate implication that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals the inverse of atemporal risk 
attitudes. In economic models of addiction where the intertemporal utility function is not additively separable, 
this link between instantaneous risk attitudes and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is broken (see 
Bommier [2007], Bommier, Kochov and Le Grand [2017] and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018]). 
7 Adjacent complementarity implies that anything that affects consumption of the addictive good at one point in 
time will affect consumption of the addictive good at all points in time. For example, an expected increase in 
future prices will not only decrease consumption when the change comes into effect but will also decrease 
consumption in every period leading up to that date. This is an important testable implication of the BM model 
that has led to a cottage industry of econometric models which attempt to show that consumers respond to future 
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tradition that descended from BM, because it provides a rationale for why agents continue to 
consume their targets of addiction despite the decline in welfare associated with increases in 
the stock of addictive capital. 
 
The BM model and its extensions are special cases of more general models of 
consumption habit formation, which, as Bommier and Rochet [2006, p. 725-726] recognise, 
place strong restrictions on the intertemporal utility function through the assumption of 
adjacent complementarity. Specifically, consumption of the addictive good increases the 
stock of addictive capital, and increases in the stock of addictive capital increase the marginal 
utility of addictive consumption, ∂2U(x)/(∂xt-1∂xt) > 0, implying that agents in these models 
are typically intertemporally risk seeking.8 
 
Psychologists have not generally regarded the BM model as providing an accurate 
specification of addiction, precisely because it mispredicts the dynamics of the typical life-
course of an addiction. Almost all addicts eventually achieve abstinence or controlled, 
moderate consumption, and most do so without clinical intervention or therapy (see Heyman 
[2009]). According to the BM model this must indicate eventual correction of an initial error 
by the addict in forecasting her utility. But this directly conflicts with the fact that most 
addicts also achieve recovery only after first experiencing multiple periods of attempts at 
control, during which anhedonic costs of withdrawal are fully paid, followed by relapse. It is 
perhaps plausible that people make initial forecasting errors preceding addiction. However, 
the psychological literature has never endorsed the suggestion that people experience the full 
suite of addictive onset, effects, increased tolerance, welfare losses, and withdrawal 
symptoms, then repeat their initial forecasting errors, and indeed do so multiple times.9  
 
A more recent wave of economic models of addiction aligns with the general view of 
psychologists and psychiatrists that addiction is not “rational” in the sense of BM, that is, that 
                                               
price changes by adjusting current consumption. For a review of this literature in relation to tobacco smoking 
see Chaloupka and Warner [2001]. For critiques of this literature see Ferguson [2000] and Baltagi [2007]. 
8 Although stochastic economic models of addiction typically assume, sometimes implicitly, that agents are 
intertemporally risk seeking, Bommier and Rochet [2006] and Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily [2012] show that 
intertemporal risk aversion is in fact compatible with habit formation. 
9 Chaiton et al. [2016] use the longitudinal Ontario Tobacco Survey to estimate the average number of quit 
attempts it takes to quit smoking successfully. They evaluate four different statistical methods and find that the 
average number of quit attempts is 6.1 using the standard cross-sectional “recalled lifetime quit attempts” 
metric. This average rises to 30 quit attempts using their preferred method (Method 3) to estimate the 
probability of a successful quit attempt on the basis of observed quit rates. 
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it necessarily implies intertemporal and perhaps even synchronous, preference ambivalence.10 
The influence of these newer modelling approaches has not been substantially absorbed in the 
economic literature on addiction regulation and taxation. This no doubt partly represents 
normal dissemination lag, but it likely also reflects the fact that there is not yet a canonical 
general economic model on which theorists have converged. This in turn reflects the fact that 
where there is consensus among psychologists on the underlying general mechanisms of 
addictive learning, these mechanisms are not characterized in terms of choice, rational or 
otherwise. As Heyman [2009] argues, this is does not imply that addictive consumption is not 
chosen. The point is rather that there is at present no generally accepted model of addictive 
choice that is regarded as best fitting the comprehensive body of clinical and other 
observations.  
 
In general, psychologists do not view addiction as a variety of habit formation, in 
either the everyday sense or in the economist’s technical sense. Certainly addicts often form 
habits, for example, in being willing to pay costs to stick to their usual brand of cigarettes. 
And furthermore, familiar experiences associated with such habits can cue addictive cravings 
through mechanisms of associative learning. But addiction is not regarded by psychologists 
or clinicians as a kind of habit.11  
 
Therefore, whereas the BM model and its refinements (see Orphanides and Zervos 
[1995] and Gruber and Köszegi [2001]), predict intertemporal risk seeking, the more recent 
“behavioural” models are agnostic about the intertemporal risk preferences of addicts. This 
relationship needs to be investigated empirically, in the context of general theories of choice 
under uncertainty. We provide such an investigation.  
 
 
  
                                               
10 Examples of such models are Laibson [2001], Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin [2003], Bénabou and 
Tirole [2004], Benhabib and Bisin [2004], Bernheim and Rangel [2004], Fudenberg and Levine [2006; 2011; 
2012], and Gul and Pesendorfer [2007]. 
11 Addiction arises when the simple conditioned learning system implemented in the primitive ventral striatum 
of the brain, that humans share with other mammals, learns that a stereotyped action sequence (e.g., taking out 
the cigarette pack, taking out the cigarette, lighting it) reliably produces a strong reward that the brain perceives 
as varying stochastically across the whole estimation interval that the system scans. This sets a prediction 
problem for it that the system cannot solve. But the brain cannot stop trying to solve this prediction problem 
given a behaviourally or perceptually associated cue. The stereotyped behaviour sequences might be regarded as 
a kind of habit. But this is not habitual consumption of the kind associated in economic models with 
intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
After receiving ethics approval and permission to access students and staff at UCT, 
we sent out emails describing the study to all students and approximately 20% of staff 
members.12 Given our interest in smoking behaviour the emails included a web link to an 
online, sign-up survey that contained the following three questions about smoking: 1) “Have 
you ever smoked cigarettes?” (Yes/No); 2) “If you answered Yes to question 1), have you 
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your life?” (Yes/No); 3) “If you answered Yes to question 
1), do you currently smoke cigarettes, occasionally or regularly?” (Yes/No). A pool of over 
2,000 students and 220 staff members completed the sign-up survey to take part in the study. 
We sampled from the student and staff groups separately, and the two groups were never 
mixed within a given laboratory session. 
 
For students, we defined two groups from which to randomly select study 
participants: a smoker group (defined by answering yes to questions 1, 2, and 3 above) of 
approximately 500 people, and a group of approximately 1,000 people comprising ex-
smokers (defined by answering yes to questions 1 and 2 but no to question 3) and non-
smokers (defined by answering no to question 1).13 Those people who were randomly 
selected to take part in the study (260 smokers and 160 ex-smokers and non-smokers) were 
added to a dedicated, restricted-access site on the university’s virtual learning environment 
which allowed them to sign up for an experimental session that did not conflict with their 
academic timetable. A total of 8 sessions were conducted with students between November 
2016 and March 2017. Given the limited number of staff members who applied to take part in 
the study, all of the 220 people who filled in the sign-up survey were added to a dedicated, 
restricted-access site on the university’s virtual learning environment so that they could sign 
up for an experimental session that suited their work schedule. These 5 sessions were 
conducted in August 2017. In total, we recruited and processed 256 subjects: 145 students 
and 111 staff members. 
                                               
12 UCT prevents researchers from emailing all staff members (approximately 6,700 people) because they do not 
want staff to be inundated with requests to participate in research studies. Consequently, researchers are given a 
spreadsheet containing basic information on all staff members, e.g., faculty, pay class, gender, etc., and are 
instructed to select approximately 20% of the people on the spreadsheet so that emails can be sent out to them. 
We were advised not to select staff members in the lowest pay classes (pay classes 1 – 4) because they do not 
have regular access to email, and we chose not to include any staff members from UCT’s satellite campuses. 
Random selection of the remaining staff members produced the 20% sample that was used for recruitment. 
13 There were approximately 600 students who answered yes to question 1 but no to question 2. They were 
excluded from the sampling frame so that we could focus on smokers, ex-smokers who had smoked more than 
100 cigarettes, and non-smokers who had never smoked cigarettes. 
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The experiment took place in a computer lab at UCT which had been set up to run the 
experimental software developed by us, which is discussed in more detail below. Subjects 
were separated by partitions and were asked not to talk to each other during the session. We 
employed a team of three research assistants (RAs) to help run the sessions, administer 
payments, and answer questions. 
 
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were randomly allocated to a computer terminal and 
were asked to read and sign a consent form. When everyone had signed the consent form, an 
RA went through a short presentation14 which provided a description of what would take 
place in the session. At the end of the introductory presentation, subjects were asked to read 
atemporal risk preference task instructions and to raise their hands when they were finished. 
When a subject raised her hand, an RA asked the subject to put on a set of headphones and 
watch a video15  that we developed to further explain the task and familiarise the participant 
with the screen-based, decision-making environment. This approach was adopted for all of 
the tasks: subjects received written and audio-visual instructions and were required to go 
through both of them before completing the task. After finishing the atemporal risk 
preference task video, the subject raised her hand and was then allowed to complete the task. 
After completing the choice task itself, the subject rolled two 10-sided dice to randomly 
select one of the choices that was made, and then rolled the two 10-sided dice again to 
resolve the chosen lottery. An RA recorded the subject’s earnings for the task on a payment 
receipt that would be used to determine the subject’s final earnings at the end of the 
experimental session. 
 
The subject was then asked to read the written instructions for the time preference 
task before proceeding to the audio-visual instructions.16 When the video was finished, the 
subject completed the task and then rolled a 20-sided die and a 4-sided die to randomly select 
one of the choices that was made. An RA recorded this amount and the payment date on the 
subject’s payment receipt. 
 
Following the completion of the time preference task, subjects read through 
instructions for the intertemporal risk preference task before watching the audio-visual 
                                               
14 Appendix A includes the introductory presentation, the atemporal risk preference task instructions, the time 
preference task instructions, and the intertemporal risk preference task instructions. 
15 See https://www.dropbox.com/s/ymnt3brtldrxv2m/Risk_Demo.mp4?dl=0. 
16 See https://www.dropbox.com/s/rzmvbetpzabd6d0/Time_Demo.mp4?dl=0.  
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instructions.17 After completing the task, the subject rolled a 4-sided die and a 10-sided die to 
randomly select one of the choices that was made, and an RA recorded the amounts and 
payment dates for this choice on the subject’s payment receipt. 
 
Subjects then completed a task that elicited their subjective beliefs about the mortality 
risks of smoking. After reading through and watching audio-visual instructions explaining the 
task, subjects responded to 10 questions, e.g., “For adults 35 years of age and older, what 
percentage of deaths from lung cancer are associated with smoking in the United States 
between 2005 and 2009?”18 
 
When a subject had finished all four tasks, she then completed a questionnaire on the 
computer which included 10 questions on demographic and socio-economic characteristics as 
well as a number of modules designed to gather information on smoking behaviour and other 
potentially co-occurring mental disorders, e.g., anxiety, depression, and alcohol use disorder. 
With regard to smoking behaviour, we included the tobacco and nicotine use module from 
the National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) 
described by Grant and Dawsom [2006]; the Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence 
(FTCD) described by Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker and Fagerström [1991] and Fagerström 
[2012]; and the diagnostic criteria for tobacco use disorder and tobacco withdrawal in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) documented in 
American Psychiatric Association [2013]. 
 
While subjects completed the questionnaire, an RA determined their total earnings for 
all of the tasks. All subjects received a show-up fee of R40. The show-up fee together with 
earnings for the atemporal risk preference task and subjective beliefs task were paid out 
immediately in cash, and earnings for the time preference task and intertemporal risk 
preference task were paid out on the dates corresponding to the subject’s choices on the 
randomly selected questions. Delayed payments were effected via electronic transfer and 
subjects received a payment notification on their cell phones as soon as the transfers took 
place. Such transfers are a common means of payment in South Africa and were used to 
reduce the transaction costs which subjects would have had to incur by coming to collect 
their delayed payments from us. Experimental sessions lasted approximately 1.5 hours and 
                                               
17 See https://www.dropbox.com/s/qphnjz6z04a13lw/Risk_and_Time_Demo.mp4?dl=0.  
18 The subjective beliefs task is not the focus of our analysis. 
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subjects earned R920 (roughly $150 at purchasing power parity (PPP) at the time) on 
average. 
 
A. Atemporal Risk Preference Task 
The atemporal risk preference task interface was based on Hey and Orme [1994]. It 
presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries on a screen, displayed in Figure 1 as 
pie charts with accompanying text that listed the probabilities and monetary amounts of the 
prizes. Subjects made 90 choices in the task and then rolled dice to randomly select one 
choice for payment. 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk Preference Task Interface 
 
The 90 lottery pairs were drawn from the designs of Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994], 
Loomes and Sugden [1998], Cox and Sadiraj [2008, p. 33], and Harrison, Martínez-Correa 
and Swarthout [2015]. These lottery pairs were chosen to provide good coverage of the 
probability space, to facilitate the estimation of non-EUT models of choice under atemporal 
risk, to investigate the calibration puzzle of Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000], and to 
determine whether subjects satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom.19 Each lottery 
pair was drawn randomly, without replacement, from this battery and presented to subjects 
                                               
19 Appendix B includes a detailed discussion of the lottery pairs that were used in the atemporal risk preference 
task. 
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sequentially. The task used prize magnitudes between R0 and R700 ($0 - $112 at PPP) and 
probabilities which varied in increments of 0.05 between 0 and 1.  
 
  B. Time Preference Task 
The time preference task presented subjects with choices between smaller, sooner 
(SS) and larger, later (LL) rewards, illustrated in Figure 2. On each screen subjects made 4 
choices before proceeding to the next screen. The principal (i.e., SS reward) and time horizon 
were fixed on each screen but varied across screens. A calendar was displayed on every 
screen to show subjects when they would receive the amounts of money they chose. 
 
 
Figure 2: Time Preference Task Interface 
 
Following Coller and Williams [1999], two front end delays (FEDs) to the SS rewards 
were used: zero days and 7 days. This design allows one to hold subjective transaction costs 
constant for the SS and LL rewards at the positive 7-day FED. It also facilitates estimation of 
the parameters of a QH or β-δ discounting function, because the zero-day FED allows one to 
pin down the estimate of β, which captures a “passion for the present” or “present-bias” in 
decision making, whereas the 7-day FED allows one to then identify the long-term 
discounting parameter δ.20 Subjects in an experimental session were exposed to both of these 
FED treatments. 
 
Two principals (R250 and R400; $40 and $64 at PPP), four time horizons (7, 14, 42, 
                                               
20 To easily distinguish between the two parameters of the QH discounting model, we refer to the “present-bias” 
discounting parameter β and the “long-term” discounting parameter δ. 
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and 84 days), and nominal annual interest rates between 5% and 250% were used in the time 
preference task. These parameters, together with the FEDs, define a battery of 224 possible 
choice pairs. Each subject made 60 choices in the task which were drawn randomly, without 
replacement, from this battery. At the end of the time preference task, the subject rolled dice 
to randomly select one of these choices for payment. 
 
C. Intertemporal Risk Preference Task 
The intertemporal risk preference task interface was based on Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström [2018]. On each screen, illustrated by Figure 3, it presented subjects with a 
choice between two risky profiles of outcomes that were paid out at different points in time 
(viz., intertemporal lotteries). Probabilities were communicated by text and pie charts, prizes 
were listed numerically, and the dates on which the prizes would be paid out were displayed 
in text and on a calendar.  
 
 
Figure 3: Intertemporal Risk Preference Task Interface 
 
The pairs of intertemporal lotteries were structured in the following way. For a 
particular pair, lottery A assigned a probability of, say, 0.1 to receiving a larger amount Lt at 
time t and a smaller amount St+τ at time t+τ (Lt, St+τ) and a probability of 0.9 to receiving the 
smaller amount St at time t and the larger amount Lt+τ at time t+τ (St, Lt+τ). Lottery B, by 
contrast, assigned a probability of 0.1 to receiving Lt and Lt+τ and a probability of 0.9 to 
receiving St and St+τ. In this example, lottery A is the “safe” intertemporal lottery because the 
subject always earns L + S, whereas lottery B is the “risky” intertemporal lottery because the 
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subject either earns 2L or 2S. We constructed 40 of these intertemporal lotteries, broken 
down into 4 sets of 10, with prizes St = St+τ and Lt = Lt+τ in each set. Each set of 10 
intertemporal lotteries included prizes with probability p(Lt, St+τ) = p(Lt, Lt+τ) starting at 0.1, 
and increasing by 0.1 until the last choice was between two degenerate intertemporal 
lotteries. Using the example above, the last choice in this set was between lottery A that pays 
(Lt, St+τ) with certainty and lottery B that pays (Lt, Lt+τ) with certainty; lottery B clearly 
dominates lottery A in this pair and is a test of subject comprehension or monotonicity of 
preferences. 
 
To construct our battery of intertemporal lotteries, we used a 7-day FED to the sooner 
reward, two time horizons of 14 days and 42 days between the rewards, and the following 
two sets of larger (L) amounts and smaller (S) amounts: (R450, R20; $72, $3 at PPP) and 
(R260, R10; $42, $1.50 at PPP). Each intertemporal lottery pair was drawn at random, 
without replacement, from this battery and presented to subjects sequentially. The order in 
which the intertemporal lotteries appeared (i.e., whether the “safe” lottery appeared as the 
“Top” choice or the “Bottom” choice in Figure 3) varied randomly across screens. At the end 
of the task, the subject rolled dice to randomly select one choice for payment. 
 
D. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of 256 subjects. The average age in 
the sample is approximately 30 years old, 27% of the sample is White21, 43% is male, and, 
coincidentally, 43% of the sample is made up of staff. Subjects were asked to rate their 
current financial situation on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented “very broke” and 5 
represented “in very good shape.” The mean response of 2.80 implies that, on average, 
subjects were neither broke nor in good shape at the time of their experimental session. Non-
smokers make up 52% of the sample, ex-smokers constitute 12% of the sample, and smokers 
comprise the remaining 36% of the sample.22 
 
                                               
21 Designation of population groups or “races” follows the traditional categorisation in South Africa that is still 
employed in affirmative action and related policies, notwithstanding recognition that it involves cultural and 
historical discriminations that are without biological significance. Approximately 30% of the sample is Black 
and 31% is Coloured, a culturally salient population group in South Africa composed of individuals of mainly 
Malaysian and Indonesian descent who speak Afrikaans as a first language. Of the remaining sample, 9% is 
Indian and 3% preferred not to classify their race. 
22 According to The Tobacco Atlas (see www.tobaccoatlas.org and Drope et al. [2018]) 26.5% of men and 5.5% 
of women smoke tobacco daily in South Africa. The prevalence rate for men is lower than in other medium Human 
Development Index (HDI) countries but the prevalence rate for women is higher than in other medium-HDI 
countries. Prevalence rates for selected high-income countries are: US – men: 14.4%, women: 11.7%; UK – men: 
19.9%, women: 18.1%; Australia – men: 15.6%, women: 13.3%; Germany – men: 25.1%, women: 17.1%.  
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An estimate from the South African National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey of the mean number of cigarettes smoked per day by current smokers in South Africa 
is 7.4. For people residing in the Western Cape, where the present study was conducted, the 
mean is 8.5 (see Shisana et al. [2013, p. 114-115]). The smokers in our study reported the 
average number of cigarettes they typically smoked in a day, and the mean across all 
responses was 8.129 with a standard deviation of 5.317.  
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Demographics   
Age 29.948 11.887 
White 0.266 0.443 
Male 0.434 0.497 
Financial situation today 2.840 1.041 
Staff 0.434 0.497 
Non-smoker 0.520 0.501 
Ex-smoker 0.117 0.322 
Current smoker 0.363 0.482 
FTCD score 2.495 2.119 
Average cigarettes per day 8.129 5.317 
Treatments - Time Preferences   
FED: 0 days 0.502 0.500 
FED: 7 days 0.498 0.500 
High Principal 0.501 0.500 
 
Smokers also completed the FTCD, which is a measure of smoking severity that 
scores people on a scale of 0 to 10, with higher numbers indicating greater severity. The 
average FTCD score among smokers is 2.495 with a standard deviation of 2.119.23 In the 
experimental literature on atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and smoking 
behaviour, reviewed in detail by HHRS, researchers often try to maximise the difference 
between smokers and non-smokers by selecting heavy smokers to take part in the study, e.g., 
at least 20 cigarettes smoked per day for the last 5 years and a FTCD score of at least 6 in 
Bickel, Odum and Madden [1999]. We recruited smokers across the entire spectrum of 
severity to determine whether being a smoker, irrespective of intensity, is associated with 
                                               
23 Fagerström and Furberg [2008] compare smokers’ FTCD scores using nationally-representative studies in 13 
countries and find that these scores range from 2.8 to 4.6. FTCD scores are highest in Sweden and the United 
States and lowest in Germany and Norway. 
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atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences. This also 
allows us to explore the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, 
intertemporal risk preferences, and smoking intensity. 
 
Table 2 shows that randomisation in the time preference task ensured that FED 
treatments were split evenly across the sample, and 50% of choices in the time preference 
task involved the high principal of R400. 
 
4. ECONOMETRICS 
 
We adopt the statistical approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] to 
estimate the parameters of an intertemporal utility function24 jointly with the parameters 
defining atemporal risk preferences and time preferences.  
 
Our intertemporal risk preference experiment used intertemporal lotteries that paid 
out amounts of money at two different points in time. Taking this into account, (1) can be 
simplified as follows 
 UU(xt,	xt+τ) = E+θ,Dtu(xt) + Dt+τu(xt+τ)-.. (2)  
 
To admit the possibility that the intertemporal utility function is not additively 
separable, we use a power function for θ(･): 
 θ,Dtu(xt)	+	Dt+τu(xt+τ)- = 	 ,Dtu(xt)	+	Dt+τu(xt+τ)-
ρ (3)  
where θ(z) = ln z if ρ = 0, and θ(z) = –zρ if ρ < 0, following Wakker [2008]. With this power 
function specification, ρ = 1 yields the standard additively-separable model and intertemporal 
risk neutrality, ρ < 1 denotes intertemporal risk aversion, and ρ > 1 represents intertemporal 
risk seeking behaviour. 
 
The intertemporal lotteries in our experiment only had two possible states of nature. 
Consider the “safe” intertemporal lottery A where the decision maker receives (Lt, St+τ) with 
probability p and (St, Lt+τ) with probability 1 – p. Given the assumption that θ(z) = zρ, the 
stochastic discounted utility (SDU) of intertemporal lottery A is 
SDUA = ω(p) × [Dt u(Lt) + Dt+τ u(St+τ)]ρ + [1 – ω(p)] × [Dt u(St) + Dt+τ u(Lt+τ)]ρ, (4)  
                                               
24 The term “intertemporal utility function” encompasses both deterministic and stochastic choice contexts. To 
emphasise the stochastic nature of our intertemporal risk preference task, we instead use the term “stochastic 
discounted utility” below. 
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where ω : p → [0, 1] with ωʹ(p) > 0. Apart from the specific functional form for θ(･), 
equation (4) is completely general because we have not made any parametric assumptions 
about u(･), Dt, and ω(･). 
 
Now consider the “risky” intertemporal lottery B where the decision maker receives 
(Lt, Lt+τ) with probability p and (St, St+τ) with probability 1 – p. The SDU of intertemporal 
lottery B is 
SDUB = ω(p) × [Dt u(Lt) + Dt+τ u(Lt+τ)]ρ + [1 – ω(p)] × [Dt u(St) + Dt+τ u(St+τ)]ρ. (5)  
 
To write out the likelihood function for the choices the subjects made and estimate the 
parameters of the SDU model, we need to parameterise the functions u(･), Dt, and ω(･). We 
consider the simplest case of EUT and exponential discounting first, and then discuss 
extensions to non-EUT and non-exponential specifications. 
 
Under EUT, ω(p) = p, and under exponential discounting DEt = 1 / (1 + δ)t. We let 
atemporal utility be defined by a power utility function that displays constant relative risk 
aversion 
 u(x) = xr, (6)  
where u(x) = ln x if r = 0, and u(x) = –xr if r < 0.  
 
With these assumptions, we can jointly estimate the atemporal risk preference 
parameter r, the time preference parameter δ, and the intertemporal risk preference parameter 
ρ by forming a latent ∇SDU index that captures the difference in the stochastic discounted 
utility of intertemporal lotteries A and B. We adopt the contextual utility behavioural error 
specification of Wilcox [2011] and define the latent index as 
 ∇SDU = [(SDUB – SDUA) / λ] / ψ, (7)  
where ψ is a behavioural error term for the intertemporal risk preference task and the term λ 
normalises the difference in SDU of intertemporal lotteries A and B to lie within the unit 
interval. 
 
The likelihood of the intertemporal risk preference choices, conditional on the SDU 
specification being true, depends on the estimates of r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, and ψ, where μ is a 
behavioural error term for the atemporal risk preference task and υ is a behavioural error term 
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for the time preference task, just as ψ is the behavioural error term for the intertemporal risk 
preference task. The conditional log-likelihood is 
ln L(r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, ψ; c, X) = ∑i[(ln Λ(∇SDU × I(ci = 1)) + (ln Λ(∇SDU × I(ci = 0))], (8)  
where ci = 1(0) denotes the choice of intertemporal lottery B(A) in intertemporal risk 
preference task i, Λ is the logistic cumulative distribution function, and X is a vector of 
individual characteristics capturing smoking status, gender, age, etc.  
 
The joint likelihood of the atemporal risk preference, time preference, and 
intertemporal risk preference responses can then be written as 
 ln L(r, μ, δ, υ, ρ, ψ; c, X) = ln LARP + ln LTP + ln LSDU, (9)  
where ln LARP is the conditional log-likelihood of the atemporal risk preference choices, ln 
LTP is the conditional log-likelihood of the time preference choices, and ln LSDU is defined by 
(8). 
 
It is straightforward to extend (9) to incorporate non-EUT models of choice under 
atemporal risk and non-exponential discounting specifications. For example, in the case of 
QH discounting, we replace DEt = 1 / (1 + δ)t with DQHt = β / (1 + δ)t. We then form the latent 
∇SDU index in (7) and proceed as before with one additional parameter (β) to estimate in (9). 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
We estimate the SDU model (9) jointly with the parameters defining atemporal risk 
preferences and time preferences. Based on analyses of the atemporal risk preference data 
and time preference data, we extend the econometric specification in (9) to incorporate a 
RDU model of choice under atemporal risk and a QH model of time preferences. This 
specification is then used to analyse the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time 
preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and three measures of smoking behaviour: 
smoking status; smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day; 
and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD. 
 
A. Baseline Estimates 
We estimate the homogenous preference SDU model (9) under the assumptions that 
EUT characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential; Table C1 
in the appendix presents the results. The estimate of the atemporal risk preference parameter r 
= 0.409, which is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001), implies that the sample is moderately 
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risk averse, whereas the estimate of the exponential discounting parameter δ = 0.782 
indicates that future rewards are discounted at the relatively high rate of 78.2% per annum. 
The estimate of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ is –1.043, which is significantly 
less than 1 (p < 0.001), and shows that the sample is characterised by a high level of 
intertemporal risk aversion. Recall that when ρ = 1, the SDU model is additively separable, 
which implies intertemporal risk neutrality. Thus, our results show that the most common 
model of intertemporal choice in economics, viz., the additively-separable model, is not an 
accurate description of the intertemporal risk preferences of our sample. This echoes the 
result in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] but with a higher level of 
intertemporal risk aversion in our sample.25 
 
HHRS emphasise the importance of appropriately characterising a sample’s atemporal 
risk attitudes when drawing inferences about its discounting behaviour because, as Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008] showed, estimates of utility function curvature 
significantly affect estimates of discounting parameters. Under EUT, atemporal risk 
preferences are determined solely by the curvature of the utility function over outcomes, 
whereas under RDU atemporal risk preferences are determined jointly by the curvature of the 
utility function and the probability weighting function (PWF). This implies that if there is 
evidence of probability weighting in a sample then this needs to be taken into account when 
estimating time preference models or else this probability-weighting source of atemporal risk 
preferences will show up in the curvature of the utility function under EUT and bias 
discounting parameter estimates.  
 
This logic extends naturally to the SDU model because it is estimated jointly with the 
parameters defining atemporal risk preferences and time preferences. Consequently, it is 
important to accurately identify atemporal risk preferences and time preferences when 
estimating a SDU model because these atemporal risk preference and time preference 
estimates propagate into inferences drawn from the SDU model. We therefore investigate 
whether there is evidence of non-EUT and non-exponential discounting in our data so that the 
SDU model can be extended to incorporate these features. 
 
                                               
25 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2018] use the following functional form for u(･) and θ(･) in their 
structural econometric model: u(x) = x1 – r / (1 – r) and  θ(z) = z1 – ρ / (1 – ρ). Their estimates are not directly 
comparable to ours because we use power functions for u(･) and θ(･). Estimating our model on their data, the 
estimate of ρ is 0.563, and implies far lower levels of intertemporal risk aversion than we find in our sample.	
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We begin by estimating EUT and RDU models of choice under atemporal risk; see 
Table C2 in the appendix for the results. A crucial ingredient of a RDU model is the 
specification of the PWF. Owing to its flexibility, we use the Prelec [1998] function 
 π(p) =  exp[ -η(-ln p)φ], (10)  
which is defined for 1 > p > 0, η > 0 and φ > 0. This function nests a power PWF when η = 1, 
and it nests a one-parameter function when φ = 1 that admits linear, inverse S-shaped, and S-
shaped forms. 
 
Figure 4 graphs the estimates of the Prelec PWF from the RDU model in Table C2 
along with the implied decision weights for 2, 3, and 4 outcome equi-probable reference 
lotteries.26 We cannot reject the hypothesis that η = 1, but the estimate of φ = 0.629 is 
significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001), which yields an inverse S-shaped PWF with 
overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high probabilities.27 
For 3-outcome and 4-outcome reference lotteries, this form of probability weighting implies 
decision weights for the highest and lowest ranked lottery prizes that exceed the 
corresponding probabilities, and decision weights for intermediate prizes that are less than the 
corresponding probabilities. This subjective distortion of objective probabilities leads to a 
statistically significant increase (p < 0.001) in the estimate of r = 0.553 under the RDU model 
compared to the estimate of r = 0.408 under the EUT model. In turn, this increase in the 
power function parameter r under RDU leads to a statistically significant increase (p < 0.001) 
in the estimate of the exponential discount rate δ = 1.192 compared to the estimate of δ = 
0.785 under EUT; Table C3 in the appendix presents the results from exponential discounting 
models under the assumption that either EUT or RDU characterises choice under atemporal 
risk. Thus the statistically significant evidence of probability weighting has an economically 
significant impact on estimates of the exponential discount rate. This again demonstrates the 
                                               
26 An equi-probable reference lottery is one where the probabilities assigned to prizes are equal. Thus, in the 
case of a 2-outcome equi-probable reference lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.5. For a 3-outcome equi-
probable reference lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.30; and for a 4-outcome equi-probable reference 
lottery, each prize has a probability of 0.25. The dashed lines in the right panel of Figure 4 represent these 
reference probabilities: 0.25, 0.33, and 0.5. 
27 Table C2 shows that the sample as a whole is better characterised by RDU than EUT, but this does not imply 
that every person in our sample probability weights and, therefore, departs from EUT. Figure C1 in the appendix 
shows the results from an individual-level analysis where we estimate EUT and RDU specifications for each 
subject and then test whether ω(p) = p in the RDU model. Using a 5% level of statistical significance, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that ω(p) = p for 57% of the sample, implying that at least half of the people in our study 
are better characterised by EUT than RDU. However, the remaining 43% of the sample exhibits statistically 
significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting. As we show, it is necessary to take this probability 
weighting into account when drawing inferences about time preferences and intertemporal risk preferences at 
the level of the sample of subjects. 
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importance of correctly characterising atemporal risk preferences when estimating time 
preferences.  
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Probability Weighting Function and Implied Decision Weights 
 
Similarly, we find statistically significant evidence of non-exponential discounting 
when estimating a QH discounting function jointly with a RDU model; Table C4 in the 
appendix presents the results. Our estimate of β is 0.960, and is significantly less than 1 (p < 
0.001), which generates declining discount rates over time and a significantly (p < 0.001) 
lower estimate of the long-term discount rate δ = 0.885 compared to the estimate of δ = 1.192 
under the assumption of exponential discounting. 
 
In sum, analyses of the atemporal risk preference data and time preference data 
suggest that we should estimate our SDU model jointly with a RDU model to incorporate 
nonlinear probability weighting in choice under atemporal risk, and a QH discounting model 
to account for a present-bias in intertemporal decision making. Table 3 presents the results 
from this model.  
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Table 3 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 
Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 
  Estimate 
Atemporal Risk Preferences 
Power function parameter (r) 0.522*** 
 (0.019) 
PWF parameter (φ) 0.716*** 
 (0.019) 
PWF parameter (η) 1.027*** 
 (0.028) 
Error (μ) 0.140*** 
  (0.005) 
Time Preferences 
Discounting parameter (β) 0.961*** 
 (0.003) 
Discounting parameter (δ) 0.840*** 
 (0.066) 
Error (υ) 0.874*** 
  (0.140) 
Intertemporal Risk Preferences 
Power function parameter (ρ) -0.644*** 
 (0.218) 
Error (ψ) 0.286*** 
  (0.022) 
N 48640 
log-likelihood -28351.110 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
The atemporal risk preference estimates indicate a moderate level of utility function 
curvature and statistically significant evidence of inverse S-shaped probability weighting. 
The time preference results show that there is a discontinuous β = 0.961 drop in the value of a 
reward if it is not available immediately but this drop asymptotes toward the long-term 
discount rate δ = 0.840 over time. With regard to intertemporal risk preferences, there is a 
marked and statistically significant (p < 0.001) increase in the estimate of ρ = -0.644 in Table 
3 relative to the estimate of ρ = -1.043 under the assumptions of EUT and exponential 
discounting; see Table C1 in the appendix. These results show that in a joint estimation 
framework, atemporal risk preference, time preference, and intertemporal risk preference 
estimates are inextricably linked. Hence, correct specification of the constituent parts of a 
SDU model is necessary for valid statistical inference. We therefore analyse the relationship 
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between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and 
smoking behaviour using the statistical specification in Table 3.  We also estimate alternative 
specifications to test the robustness of our results. 
 
B. Smoking Status 
HHRS, using a sample of 175 UCT students in 2012, find that atemporal risk 
preferences do not differ as a function of smoking status but do find that smokers discount 
the future significantly more heavily than non-smokers. We evaluate these findings with a 
larger sample of UCT students and staff that has more variation in demographic and socio-
economic characteristics. In addition, we specifically recruited ex-smokers so as to draw 
comparisons between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers. Finally, our experiment 
elicited intertemporal risk preferences so we can analyse the relationship between smoking 
status and the curvature of the intertemporal power function parameter ρ in our SDU model. 
 
Table D1 in the appendix presents results from the SDU model under the assumptions 
that a RDU model with a power utility function and the Prelec PWF characterise choice 
under atemporal risk, and that discounting is QH. We allow the parameters of the model to 
vary as a linear function of smoking status, demographics, and socio-economic 
characteristics. There are no statistically significant differences in the atemporal risk 
preferences of smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers, which accords with the findings of 
HHRS. This result is robust to the assumptions that EUT characterises choice under 
atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential.28 
 
With regard to time preferences, the estimate of δSmokers is 0.356, and implies that 
smokers discount at a significantly higher rate than non-smokers (p < 0.001). This difference 
in discounting behaviour is economically significant: the long-term discount rate of smokers 
is 36 percentage points higher than non-smokers. The comparable results in Table E1 show 
that under the assumptions of EUT and exponential discounting, smokers discount at a 32 
percentage point higher rate than non-smokers. By contrast, there are no statistically 
significant differences in the long-term δ discounting behaviour of ex-smokers and non-
                                               
28 Appendix E presents the results of a comparable set of SDU models assuming EUT and exponential 
discounting as opposed to RDU and QH discounting. The results in appendices D and E are similar and 
differences are noted where necessary. Table E1 shows that the atemporal risk preference parameter estimate for 
smokers is 0.033, and is significantly higher (p = 0.067) than the estimate for non-smokers. This result is not 
economically significant and is a product of the covariance of estimates in a joint estimation framework. 
Analyses of the atemporal risk preference data alone show that there are no statistically significant differences in 
the atemporal risk preferences of smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers under EUT and RDU specifications. 
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smokers (p = 0.440) and of smokers and ex-smokers (p = 0.161). Moreover, there are no 
statistically significant differences between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers in terms 
of present-bias β.  
 
Figure 5 shows a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression, with a 95% 
confidence interval, of the fraction of LL choices by smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers 
at the nominal annual interest rates in the time preference task. At each interest rate, the 
estimate of smokers’ LL choice fraction is far below that of non-smokers, and the 95% 
confidence intervals do not overlap, implying that smokers discount the future at a 
significantly higher rate than non-smokers. By contrast, the estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals for ex-smokers overlap with those of smokers and non-smokers, suggesting that ex-
smokers discount at a level between smokers and non-smokers. Figure 5 provides visual 
confirmation of the results in Table D1. 
 
 
Figure 5: Fraction of LL Choices by Smoking Status 
 
Figure 6 shows a kernel density plot of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ, 
based on predictions of ρ for each subject using the covariate estimates in Table D1. The 
distribution is skewed towards high levels of intertemporal risk aversion and exhibits 
significant heterogeneity according to demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The 
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coefficient estimate of ρ for men is 0.841 (p < 0.05) and implies that they are significantly 
less intertemporally risk averse than women. There is also a strong association between a 
subject’s financial situation on the day of the experiment and estimates of intertemporal risk 
aversion. Specifically, every one category improvement on the financial situation scale is 
associated with a 0.611 (p < 0.05) increase in intertemporal risk aversion, implying that 
subjects in better financial situations are more intertemporally risk averse than subjects in 
worse financial situations. Of course, this is correlation: we are agnostic about causation. 
There are no statistically significant differences in intertemporal risk preferences between 
smokers and ex-smokers or between smokers and non-smokers, but ex-smokers are 
significantly more intertemporally risk averse than non-smokers at the 10% level. This latter 
result is not robust to the assumption that EUT and exponential discounting characterise 
atemporal risk preferences and time preferences, respectively; see Table E1 in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of the Intertemporal Risk Preference Parameter (ρ) 
 
In sum, the sample is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity in intertemporal 
risk preferences that varies as a function of gender and financial situation but not by smoking 
status. The analyses in this section suggest that the only robust behavioural difference 
between smokers, ex-smokers, and non-smokers appears to be in their long-term discounting 
Risk
Averse
Risk
Seeking
-5 -4.5 -4 -3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
ρ
 -26- 
behaviour, with smokers discounting the most, non-smokers discounting the least, and ex-
smokers discounting at a level between the two other groups. 
 
C. Smoking Intensity and Smoking Severity 
Given the historical differences in smoking prevalence for men and women29, 
together with the statistically and economically significant difference in their intertemporal 
risk preferences, we split the sample by gender to analyse the relationship between atemporal 
risk preferences, time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and measures of smoking 
intensity and smoking severity.  
 
Table 4 presents results from the SDU model estimated jointly with a RDU model, 
power utility function, and Prelec PWF for choice under atemporal risk, and a QH 
discounting function. Following HHRS, we investigate whether there is a relationship 
between smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day, and 
atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, and intertemporal risk preferences. Unlike 
HHRS, who find a concave relationship between smoking intensity and discounting 
behaviour, estimates of the quadratic term across all parameters in our model are not 
statistically significant so we only include a linear term for smoking intensity.  
 
Table 4 shows that for both men and women there is a large and statistically 
significant relationship between the number of cigarettes smoked per day and the long-term 
discounting parameter δ. Specifically, every additional cigarette smoked per day is associated 
with a 5 percentage point increase in the long-term discounting of men, whereas every 
additional cigarette smoked per day is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in the 
long-term discounting of women.30 These economically significant estimates explain why 
heavier smokers find it harder to quit: the long-term benefits that result from successful 
abstention are discounted heavily and do not exceed the short-term costs of quitting. By 
contrast, there is no statistically significant relationship between smoking intensity and the 
present-bias parameter β. 
                                               
29 Thun et al. [2013] review historical differences in male and female smoking prevalence and smoking 
behaviour in the United States since the early 20th century. They also examine male and female death rates and 
relative risks attributed to cigarette smoking during three time periods: 1959-1965, 1982-1988, and 2000-2010. 
They find marked disparities in relative risks between male and female smokers in the earlier cohorts, but 
convergence in relative risks in the most recent cohort, leading them to quote former US Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr. [1979, i], who wrote, “Women who smoke like men die like 
men who smoke.” 
30 Table E2 in the appendix shows that these results are robust to the assumptions of EUT and exponential 
discounting. 
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Table 4 also suggests that there is a relationship between smoking intensity and the 
atemporal risk attitudes of men and women. For women, the number of cigarettes smoked per 
day is statistically significant in the PWF parameter φ. For men, the number of cigarettes 
smoked per day is statistically significant in the atemporal risk preference parameter r and the 
PWF parameter φ. However, the statistically significant estimate for r is 0.005 (p < 0.05), and 
is not economically significant: a 10 cigarette increase in the smoking intensity of men is 
only associated with a 0.05 increase in the atemporal risk preference parameter r, implying 
only a modest decrease in atemporal risk aversion. Furthermore, this statistically significant 
result is likely a product of our joint estimation statistical framework, because Table D2 in 
the appendix shows that when analysing the atemporal risk preference data alone, there is no 
relationship between smoking intensity and curvature of the atemporal utility function of 
men. Similarly, the statistically significant estimate of the number of cigarettes smoked per 
day by women in the PWF parameter φ is also not present in the atemporal risk preference 
data alone. 
 
Table 4 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)     
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
White -0.025 0.031 0.022 0.027 
Financial situation -0.002 0.012 0.024 0.015 
Staff member 0.027 0.043 0.011 0.034 
Number of cigarettes 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Constant 0.589*** 0.065 0.442*** 0.053 
PWF parameter (φ)     
Age 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.003 
White 0.175** 0.076 0.039 0.066 
Financial situation -0.024 0.032 0.022 0.028 
Staff member 0.030 0.111 -0.013 0.090 
Number of cigarettes -0.015*** 0.005 0.012*** 0.004 
Constant 0.733*** 0.130 0.617*** 0.107 
PWF parameter (η)     
Age 0.016* 0.009 -0.001 0.005 
White -0.029 0.086 0.024 0.098 
Financial situation -0.008 0.047 0.108*** 0.041 
Staff member -0.184 0.152 -0.130 0.111 
Number of cigarettes 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.008 
Constant 0.648*** 0.245 0.811*** 0.151 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Discounting parameter (β)     
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
White 0.009 0.011 0.016** 0.007 
Financial situation 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 
Staff member 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.008 
Number of cigarettes -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.966*** 0.018 0.964*** 0.016 
Discounting parameter (δ)     
Age 0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.005 
White -0.399** 0.173 -0.182 0.121 
Financial situation -0.274*** 0.091 -0.185* 0.097 
Staff member -0.226 0.258 -0.125 0.166 
Number of cigarettes 0.052** 0.023 0.034** 0.014 
Constant 1.755*** 0.353 1.404*** 0.368 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)     
Age -0.050 0.034 0.025 0.048 
White -0.096 0.351 -3.995 8.671 
Financial situation -0.153 0.194 -1.038* 0.534 
Staff member 0.972 0.664 1.353 1.290 
Number of cigarettes -0.047** 0.024 0.059 0.075 
Constant 1.664* 0.945 -0.128 1.238 
Error terms     
μ 0.127*** 0.007 0.149*** 0.008 
υ 0.989*** 0.276 0.559*** 0.140 
ψ 0.208*** 0.024 0.314*** 0.028 
N 20900  26410  
log-likelihood 
-
11635.506   
-
15082.686   
Results account for clustering at the individual level    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01     
 
By contrast, the statistically significant estimate of the number of cigarettes smoked 
per day by men in the PWF parameter φ is present in the atemporal risk preference data 
alone; see Table D2. But this estimate of -0.015 is not economically significant: a 10 cigarette 
increase in the smoking intensity of men leads to a 0.15 decrease in the PWF parameter φ, 
implying only a small change in probability weighting. Thus, while there is a robust 
statistical relationship between the number of cigarettes smoked per day and the probability 
weighting of men this does not lead to substantive economic changes in atemporal risk 
attitudes. 
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Finally, Table 4 shows that smoking intensity is related to the intertemporal risk 
attitudes of men (p < 0.05) but not women (p = 0.434). For men, every additional cigarette 
smoked per day is associated with a 0.05 increase in intertemporal risk aversion, implying 
that heavier male smokers in our sample tend to be more intertemporally risk averse. This 
estimate is economically significant because an increase of 10 cigarettes smoked per day is 
associated with a 0.5 increase in intertemporal risk aversion. The point estimate for women of 
the number of cigarettes smoked per day is of the opposite sign and has a large standard 
error.31 This shows the importance of splitting the sample by gender when analysing 
intertemporal risk attitudes, because the statistically significant estimate for men is washed 
out by the large standard error of the estimate for women when the sample is pooled; see 
Table D3 in the appendix for the pooled estimates.  
 
Table D4 in the appendix presents results from the SDU model where the parameters 
are allowed to vary as a linear function of demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and 
smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD. For men and women, there are 
no statistically significant relationships between present-bias β, long-term discounting δ, and 
smoking severity. Similarly, there are no substantive relationships between smoking severity 
and the atemporal risk preferences of men and women.32 However, there is a large and 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) relationship between smoking severity and the 
intertemporal risk attitudes of men. A 1-unit increase in FTCD score is associated with a 0.44 
increase in intertemporal risk aversion, suggesting that as smoking severity increases, male 
smokers become much more intertemporally risk averse. Echoing the results for smoking 
intensity, there is no statistically significant relationship between smoking severity and the 
intertemporal risk preferences of women.33 
 
  
                                               
31 Table E2 in the appendix shows that these intertemporal risk preference results are robust to the assumptions 
of EUT and exponential discounting. 
32 Table D5 in the appendix shows the results for men and women from the RDU model estimated on the 
atemporal risk preference data alone. There are no statistically significant relationships between smoking 
severity and the atemporal risk preferences of women. For men, the FTCD score is statistically significant in the 
power function parameter r and the PWF parameter φ but only at the 10% level in both cases, and the 
coefficient estimates are not economically significant. 
33 Table E3 shows that these results are robust to the assumptions of EUT and exponential discounting. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We investigate the relationship between atemporal risk preferences, time preferences, 
intertemporal risk preferences, and three measures of smoking behaviour using an incentive-
compatible experimental design and structural econometric framework. We find statistically 
and economically significant evidence of non-linear probability weighting in choice under 
atemporal risk but no substantive differences in atemporal risk preferences by smoking status, 
smoking intensity, and smoking severity.  
 
By contrast, time preferences are related both to smoking status and smoking 
intensity. Smokers discount significantly more heavily than non-smokers, and ex-smokers 
discount at a level between these two groups. In addition, there is a large and statistically 
significant relationship between smoking intensity and the discounting behaviour of men and 
women: every additional cigarette is associated with a 3-5 percentage point increase in the 
long-term discounting parameter δ. However, smoking severity is not related to long-term 
discounting, and there are no statistically significant differences in present-bias according to 
smoking status, smoking intensity, and smoking severity. 
 
The intertemporal risk preferences of our sample are characterised by a large degree 
of heterogeneity and high levels of intertemporal risk aversion that varies according to gender 
and financial situation but not by smoking status. Analyses conducted on subsamples of men 
and women reveal that smoking intensity and smoking severity are associated with the 
intertemporal risk attitudes of men but not the intertemporal risk attitudes of woman. These 
results are robust to different models of choice under atemporal risk and alternative 
discounting specifications. 
 
Our research makes a number of contributions to the experimental economic literature 
on addiction. First, we replicate the finding of HHRS, using a larger sample with more 
demographic and socio-economic variation, that atemporal risk aversion does not differ 
substantively according to smoking status and smoking intensity, while extending this null 
result to smoking severity as measured by the FTCD. These results suggest that despite the 
clear risks involved in tobacco smoking, atemporal risk preferences are not a robust 
behavioural marker of addiction. 
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Second, we replicate the finding of economically and statistically significant 
differences in the time preferences of smokers and non-smokers, and add nuance to this result 
by including ex-smokers in the sample: ex-smokers discount at a level between smokers and 
non-smokers. This suggests a causal relationship between discounting behaviour and 
smoking status, about which we can only speculate. One hypothesis is that this mid-range 
discounting of ex-smokers explains why they were inclined to start smoking initially but then 
able to quit successfully. However, this hypothesis does not square with the fact that almost 
all smokers eventually quit successfully following multiple attempts, implying that there 
should be heavy discounters who are ex-smokers, unless causation runs in the other direction. 
Another hypothesis is that in a sample that is random with respect to age, or skewed younger 
(as our sample is), ex-smokers who quit younger should be more frequently observed than 
ex-smokers who quit older. This would then suggest that the mid-range discount rates of ex-
smokers would be negatively correlated, for causal reasons, with the number of unsuccessful 
quit attempts. Our data do not allow us to adjudicate between these alternative hypotheses. 
 
Third, we identify a large, positive relationship between smoking intensity and the 
discounting behaviour of men and women that has important implications for treatment of 
tobacco use disorder. Heavier smokers tend to have higher discount rates, which will make it 
harder for them to quit because the long-term costs of continuing to smoke and the long-term 
benefits that result from successful abstention are discounted heavily. These differences in 
smoking intensity and discounting behaviour could be leveraged in the design of smoking 
cessation programmes. For example, the reinforcement schedules of a contingency 
management smoking cessation intervention, which provides monetary incentives for 
biochemically-verified abstinence, could be tailored to the smoking intensity and discounting 
behaviour of smokers. Heavier smokers could be assigned to a front-loaded reinforcement 
schedule where they are given a large first payment for successful abstention to get them over 
the initial hump. Lighter smokers, on the other hand, could be given a uniform-incentive 
reinforcement schedule where the rewards for abstinence are held constant across visits. 
Acknowledging differences between smokers and adjusting cessation interventions 
accordingly may make treatment of tobacco use disorder more efficacious in general, and 
particularly fruitful in the case of hard-to-treat smokers. 
 
Fourth, this is the first study to have investigated the intertemporal risk preferences of 
smokers, specifically, and addicts, generally. Building on the work of Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström [2018], we provide a template for conducting this investigation that uses 
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incentive-compatible economic experiments and a structural econometric framework to 
estimate a SDU model jointly with atemporal risk preference specifications and discounting 
functions. 
 
Fifth, we show the importance of accurate identification of atemporal risk preferences 
and discounting behaviour when drawing inferences about intertemporal risk attitudes. As 
errors and uncertainty at all levels of a joint estimation framework propagate, as they should 
theoretically, it is theoretically appropriate and empirically necessary to apportion atemporal 
risk preferences into their utility function curvature and probability weighting components, 
and incorporate non-constant discounting behaviour, if it is present, when estimating SDU 
models. 
 
Finally, we identify significant heterogeneity in intertemporal risk preferences but 
find, contrary to the assumption employed by some economic models of addiction, that 
smokers do not exhibit intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. Our sample is characterised by 
a high level of intertemporal risk aversion, which does not differ significantly according to 
smoking status. However, measures of smoking intensity and smoking severity are related to 
the intertemporal risk attitudes of men: as smoking intensity and smoking severity increase, 
this is associated with statistically and economically significant increases in intertemporal 
risk aversion. By contrast, the intertemporal risk preferences of women do not differ as a 
function of smoking intensity or smoking severity. 
 
As discussed earlier, initial economic models of addiction, in taking it to be a form of 
habitual consumption, implicitly conjectured that such intertemporal risk seeking preferences 
would be fundamental to choice-based accounts. As demonstrated by Bommier and Rochet 
[2006] and Lichtendal, Chao, and Bodily [2012], however, there is no strict implication of 
intertemporal risk seeking preferences from modelling addiction as habitual consumption. 
However, a theorist might venture the following hypothesis. Stereotyped behavioural 
sequences are cues for addictive cravings (see West and Brown [2013]). Such sequences are 
habits, though not habits of consumption. Perhaps, then, people with stronger dispositions to 
adopt habits in general should be more vulnerable to pathological development of the form of 
neural associative learning that underlies addiction. This reasoning would generate the 
opposite prediction from the BM model of addiction: we would expect to find statistically 
higher intertemporal risk aversion in addicts. Our findings relating smoking severity and the 
consumption of cigarettes to the intertemporal risk preferences of men, support this idea. But 
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the lack of these relationships amongst women, at least in our sample, point to the need for 
more research into the aetiology of smoking in women (and men). 
 
Our experimental methodology points the way to further research. Clinical 
observation records that some addicts consume their addictive targets at steady and stable 
rates, while others alternate binges with dry periods (see Ainslie [1992]). The former pattern 
is suggestive of higher intertemporal risk aversion than the latter pattern. If there are two 
types of addicts who could be reliably distinguished by experimental measurements of 
intertemporal risk aversion, as our results for men suggest, this could be useful for clinicians 
choosing from menus of therapeutic interventions for patients with varying characteristics. In 
general, experimental operationalisation of structural models of heterogeneous behavioural 
response within populations is an increasingly emphasised aim and achievement of laboratory 
economics. 
 
Taken together, these results have two implications for the behavioural analysis of 
smoking. First, heterogeneity of smoking behaviour, rather than the binary classifications of 
“ever” or “never” smokers, clearly interacts with risk and time preferences. This is 
particularly evident in the smoking intensity results where increases in the number of 
cigarettes smoked per day are associated with large increases in long-term discounting 
behaviour on the one hand, and increases in the intertemporal risk aversion of men, but not 
women, on the other. Second, evidence for atemporal and intertemporal risk aversion, 
coupled with moderate levels of discounting, point to the potential role that poorly calibrated 
subjective beliefs about smoking might play in the onset and persistence of addiction. 
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APPENDIX A 
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER] 
 
The introductory presentation, atemporal risk preference task instructions, time 
preference task instructions, and intertemporal risk preference task instructions are included 
in this appendix. The introductory presentation provides an overview of the session and 
includes a detailed discussion of the physical randomisation devices used in the experiment. 
The atemporal risk preference task instructions, time preference task instructions, and 
intertemporal risk preference task instructions discuss the computer environment within 
which choices are made, the options between which the subjects must choose and how to 
interpret them, and the payment scheme that is used to determine earnings. The presentation 
and instructions were designed to promote comprehension and ensure that subjects 
understood how their choices ultimately led to the earnings they received so as to incentivise 
the truthful revelation of preferences. 
 
A. Introductory Presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction
Consent Form
• Before we can begin today’s session you need to read and 
sign a consent form which you will find in the folder in front 
of you
• You will notice that there are 2 consent forms in the folder 
and one of them is for you to take home so please place it 
in your bag now
• The consent form explains your rights as a research 
participant and, by signing it, you give your consent to 
participate in the study
• You need to sign the consent form on the last page and 
when you have done so please raise your hand
• Once everyone has signed their consent forms, we can 
continue
• If you have any questions please raise your hand and 
someone will come to answer them
• You may read through the consent form now
Welcome
• Thank you for agreeing to take part in this 
study, your views and choices will be very 
informative and helpful
• Before we get started I would like to explain 
how things are going to work
• Once that is done, we can begin with the tasks
• If you have any questions, please do not ask 
them out loud – raise your hand and someone 
will come over to you
4 Tasks and a Questionnaire
• You will take part in 4 tasks and you will have 
the opportunity to earn money in each task
• We will determine your payment for each task 
once you have finished that task and write it 
down on a payment sheet you will have 
beside you
• Once you have completed all 4 tasks, you will 
need to fill out a short questionnaire
• We will then total up your payments privately, 
as discussed in a moment
• Once this is done, you will be free to leave
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Note: This slide contained animations 
 
 
Note: This slide contained animations 
 
 
Earnings
• You will be paid R40 just for participating in 
today’s session
• At the end of each task, we will determine your 
earnings for that task
• Some of this money will be paid to you at the end 
of the session today, in private, and the rest of it 
will be paid to you in the future
• This is why we need your bank details: to pay you 
via electronic transfer at a future date
• To determine your earnings for the tasks, we will 
ask you to roll some dice
• Let’s go through a quick explanation of the dice 
you will roll
10-sided dice
• At the end of each task we will ask you to roll some dice into a 
plastic bowl which you can see below
• Two of the dice that you will roll are 10-sided dice and these are 
used to select a number between 1 and 100
• Every number between 1 and 100, and including 1 and 100, is 
equally likely to occur
• An example of a dice roll is shown below
10-sided dice
• Let’s look at a close-up of the 10-sided dice
• As you can see, one of the 10-sided dice has sides which increase in 
multiples of 10: 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90
• The other 10-sided dice has sides which increase in multiples of 1: 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
• You will roll the two 10-sided dice together and add the numbers on the 
two dice to select a number between 1 and 100
• In the example below, the number that was rolled is 86 (80 + 6)
10-sided dice
• To tell the difference between a 6 and a 9 there is a dot at 
the base of the number
• This is why the number in the picture below is a 6: there is 
a dot at the base of the 6
• 9 looks different because there is a dot at the base of the 9
• The new picture below shows you what a 9 looks like
10-sided dice
• To roll a number between 1 and 9 you need to roll 00 and a single 
number between 1 and 9
• As you can see in the picture below, the number that was rolled is 5 
(00 + 5)
• In the case where you roll 00 and 0, this will be treated as 100
• As you can see in the new picture below, the number that was 
rolled is 100 (00 and 0)
The Tasks
• We have now finished the introductory 
explanation
• You will find instructions for the first task that 
you need to complete in the folder in front of 
you
• Please read through this and when you are 
finished raise your hand so that an 
experimenter can play a video for you which 
provides further details on the task
• When this is finished you will begin the first 
task
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B. Atemporal Risk Preference Task Instructions 
 
Task Instructions 
 
This is a task where you will choose between lotteries with varying prizes and 
chances of winning. On each computer screen you will be presented with a pair of 
lotteries and you will need to choose one of them. There are 90 pairs of lotteries in 
this task. For each pair of lotteries, you should choose the lottery you prefer to play. 
You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and you will 
be paid according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about 
which lottery you prefer. 
 
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries might 
look like. 
 
 
  
The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number 
between 1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely 
to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided 
dice. 
 
In the above example, the Left lottery pays R20 with a 55% chance, R160 with a 
25% chance and R190 with a 20% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice 
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if the number drawn is between 1 and 55 you will be paid R20, if the number is 
between 56 and 80 you will be paid R160, and if the number is between 81 and 100 
you will be paid R190. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 55% of the 
area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 55 and 
your prize will be R20. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 25% of the 
area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 56 and 80 
and your prize will be R160. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 20% of 
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 81 and 
100 and your prize will be R190. 
 
Now look at the Right lottery in the example. It pays R20 with a 75% chance, and 
R250 with a 25% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice if the number 
drawn is between 1 and 75 you will be paid R20, and if the number is between 76 
and 100 you will be paid R250. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 75% 
of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 
75 and your prize will be R20. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 25% 
of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 76 and 
100 and your prize will be R250.  
 
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each 
screen, you should indicate which lottery you prefer to play by clicking on one of 
the buttons beneath the lotteries.  
 
You could also get a pair of lotteries in which one of the lotteries will give you the 
chance to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the Right lottery in the following 
screen image pays “Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected. The right pie 
chart indicates that there is a 50% chance that you get R0. So if you roll the two 10-
sided dice and the number drawn is between 1 and 50 you will be paid R0. However, 
if the number is between 51 and 100 you will toss a coin to determine if you get 
double the amount listed in green (R210). If the coin comes up Heads you get R420, 
otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed underneath each pie refer to the 
amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss. 
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For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the last example. If the 
random number drawn was 37, you would win R60; if it was 93, you would get R110. 
 
If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get R0; if 
instead you drew 93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get “Double 
or Nothing.” If the coin comes up Heads then you get R420. However, if it comes 
up Tails you get nothing from your chosen lottery. 
 
After you have worked through all of the 90 pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will 
roll two 10-sided dice until a number between 1 and 90 comes up to determine which 
pair of lotteries will be played out. Since there is a chance that any of your 90 choices 
could be played out for real, you should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the 
one that you will play out. Finally, you will roll the two ten-sided dice again to 
determine the outcome of the lottery you chose, and if necessary you will then toss 
a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” 
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It is also possible that you will be given a lottery in which there is a “Double or 
Nothing” option no matter what number you roll with the two 10-sided dice. The 
screen image below illustrates this possibility. The Right lottery in the example pays 
“Double or Nothing” for any number that is drawn with the two 10-sided dice. So 
if you select the Right lottery and roll a number between 1 and 50 you will toss a 
coin to see whether you get R0 or R120 (double R60). If you roll a number between 
51 and 100 you will toss a coin to see whether you get R0 or R420 (double R210). 
 
 
  
 
Therefore, your earnings for this task are determined by four things: 
 
• by which lottery you selected, the Left or the Right, for each of these 90 pairs; 
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the set of 90 such pairs using 
the two 10-sided dice;  
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and  
• by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen lottery outcome is of the “Double or 
Nothing” type. 
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Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may 
be presented with different lotteries, and may have different preferences, so their 
responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by 
thinking carefully about each lottery. 
 
Payment for this task is in cash, and is in addition to the R40 show-up fee that you 
receive just for being here. When you have finished the task, please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task. 
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C. Time Preference Task Instructions 
 
Task Instructions 
 
In this task you will choose between different amounts of money available at 
different times. You will need to make 60 choices in total. For each choice you will 
decide between a smaller amount of money which is available sooner and a larger 
amount of money which is available later. One of your 60 choices will be selected at 
random for payment and you will receive the amount of money you chose at the 
appropriate date. 
 
All of these choices will be made on a computer and here is an example of what the 
computer display might look like: 
 
 
 
For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is 29 
September, 2016. At the top of the display is a calendar showing you today’s date in 
a circle (29 September 2016). This date is also highlighted in purple and a future date 
is highlighted in green (13 October 2016). Below the calendar are two columns: a 
purple column with amounts of money available at an earlier date (today) and a green 
column with amounts of money available at a later date (in 14 days from today). You 
need to make 4 choices on this screen. Each choice appears on a different row. 
 
In the first row, you need to choose between receiving R300 today or R301.73 in 14 
days from today. Note that R300 is the smaller of the two amounts but it is available 
today. R301.73 is the larger of the two amounts but it is only available after 14 days. 
Suppose that you prefer R300 today over R301.73 in 14 days from today. To choose 
R300 today just click the button saying “Select” under “R300 today”. 
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Suppose instead that you prefer R301.73 in 14 days rather than R300 today. To 
choose R301.73 in 14 days just click the button saying “Select” under “R301.73 in 
14 days”.  
 
Once you have made your choice on the first row you can move on to the other 
rows on the screen. You need to make 4 choices on the screen before you can move 
on to the next set of 4 choices on a new screen. Once you have made all of your 
choices on the screen you can click the button saying “Confirm” to move on to the 
next screen. If you would like to change your choices then click “Cancel”. 
 
You will need to make 60 choices in total across 15 screens. The rand amounts 
change on each row of each screen. In addition, the times for delivery of the rand 
amounts change across screens. For example, on the screen we just looked at, you 
had to choose between an amount of money available today and an amount of 
money available in 14 days. On a different screen, you may need to choose between 
an amount of money available in 7 days and another amount of money available in 
21 days. So please pay careful attention when making your choices. 
 
When you are finished the task, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will select one of the 15 
screens from this task by rolling a 20-sided dice. If the dice lands on 1, you will select 
screen 1; if the dice lands on 7, you will select screen 7; if the dice lands on 12, you 
will select screen 12; and so on. If the dice lands on 16, 17, 18, 19 or 20, you will roll 
the dice again until it lands on a number between 1 and 15.  
 
Once you have selected a screen, you will roll a 4-sided dice to select 1 of the 4 rows 
on the screen. If the dice lands on 1, you will select row 1; if the dice lands on 2, you 
will select row 2; and so on. Once you have selected the row, we will look at the 
choice that you made on that row. You will then be paid for the choice that you 
made on that row on the date listed for that choice. For instance, in the last example, 
suppose that row 3 is selected for payment. If you chose R300 today, you will be 
paid R300 at the end of today’s session. If you chose R317.51 in 14 days then you 
will be paid R317.51 in 14 days via electronic transfer into your bank account and 
you will receive a payment notification on your cellphone when the transaction has 
taken place. That is why we need your bank account details: to pay you via electronic 
transfer, if necessary. 
 
Note that the option you prefer on each row is a matter of personal taste. The people 
next to you may have different tastes so their choices should not matter for you. 
Please work silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each option. 
Since there is a chance that any of your 60 choices could be selected for payment, 
you should approach each choice as if it is the one that you will be paid for.  
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D. Intertemporal Risk Preference Task Instructions 
 
Task Instructions 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options that we can 
think of as the TOP and BOTTOM options. An example of a choice that you will 
need to make is shown below.  
 
 
                
You will need to make 40 choices in total across 40 screens. On each screen, you 
should choose the option you prefer.  
 
The outcome of each option will be determined by the draw of a random number 
between 1 and 10. Each number is equally likely to occur, and you will draw the 
number yourself using a 10-sided dice.  
 
In the example, the TOP option pays R300 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days if the 
number is 1 or 2. It pays R30 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days if the number is 
between 3 and 10.  
 
The BOTTOM option pays R300 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days if the number is 
1 or 2. It pays R30 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days if the number is between 3 and 
10. 
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When you are finished the task, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will be paid for one of 
your choices in this task. You will select one of the 40 choices you made by rolling 
a 4-sided dice and a 10-sided dice. If you roll 1 on the 4-sided dice, you will select 
choices 1-10; if you roll 2 on the 4-sided dice, you will select choices 11-20; if you 
roll 3 on the 10-sided dice, you will select choices 21-30; and if you roll 4 on the 4-
sided dice, you will select choices 31-40. You will then roll the 10-sided dice to select 
a number between one of these ranges. For example, suppose you roll 3 on the 4-
sided dice. Then you will select choices 21-30. If you then roll 7 on the 10-sided dice 
you will select choice 27. Once the choice has been selected, you will then roll the 
10-sided dice again to determine the payment for the decision that you made. Any 
future payments will be made via electronic transfer into your bank account and you 
will receive a payment notification on your cellphone when the transaction has taken 
place. That is why we need your bank account details: to pay you via electronic 
transfer. 
 
If the example above is selected for payment and you chose the TOP option, you 
will roll the 10-sided dice to determine your earnings for this task. If you roll a 8 
then you will be paid R30 in 7 days AND R300 in 21 days. 
 
By contrast, if the example above is selected for payment and you chose the 
BOTTOM option, you will roll the 10-sided dice to determine your earnings for this 
task. If you roll a 5 then you will be paid R30 in 7 days AND R30 in 21 days. 
 
Note that the option you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you 
may have different tastes so their choices should not matter to you. Please work 
silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each option. Since there 
is a chance that any of your 40 choices could be selected for payment, you should 
approach each choice as if it is the one you will be paid for. 
 
  
  
 -A12- 
APPENDIX B 
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER] 
 
 
Risk Preference Task Lotteries 
 
The 90 lottery pairs used in the risk preference task were drawn from the designs of 
Wakker, Erev and Weber (WEW) [1994], Loomes and Sugden (LS) [1998], Cox and Sadiraj 
(CS) [ 2008, p. 33], and Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout (HMS) [2015]. 
 
WEW constructed a battery of lotteries to test the “comonotonic independence” 
axiom of rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory, due to Quiggin [1982]. Their main lottery 
pairs consist of 6 sets of 4 pairs. The logic of their design can be seen by considering the first 
set [WEW, p. 204, Figure 3.1]. The second and third prizes in each pair stay the same within 
the set of 4 lottery pairs. The only thing that varies from pair to pair is the monetary value of 
the first prize, and that is common to the two lotteries within each pair. Since the first prize is 
a common consequence in both lotteries within a pair, the independence axiom of expected 
utility theory (EUT) implies that it should not affect choices. In the 1st pair the first prize is 
only $0.50, and it is the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. The first prize increases to 
$3.50 in the 2nd pair, but it is again the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. Consequently, 
rank-dependence should have no effect on choice patterns as the subject moves from the 1st to 
the 2nd pair. By contrast, the first prize in the 3rd pair is $6.50, which makes it the second 
highest ranked prize for both lotteries; this is where RDU could generate a different 
prediction to EUT, depending on the nature and extent of probability weighting. Finally, in 
the 4th pair the common consequence of $9.50 is the highest ranked prize for both lotteries, 
again allowing RDU to predict something different to EUT, and to the choices in the 3rd pair. 
This design does not formally require a RDU decision-maker to choose differently to an EUT 
decision-maker, but simply allows it for a priori reasonable levels of probability weighting. 
We used all 24 of the main WEW lottery pairs and scaled the prizes considerably. 
 
LS designed lottery pairs to accommodate a wide range of risk preferences, to provide 
good coverage of the probability space, and to generate common ratio tests of EUT. We used 
30 lottery pairs from the LS design which provided a thorough and well-balanced coverage of 
the Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle and captured the full range of risk preferences, under 
the null hypothesis of EUT: risk-loving - gradients less than 1; risk neutral - gradients equal 
to 1; and risk averse - gradients greater than 1. 
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CS designed a simple test of the calibration puzzle posed by Hansson [1988] and 
Rabin [2000]: that the risk aversion which is observed with small stakes in the lab yields 
implausible levels of risk aversion with larger stakes. The logic of the CS design is as 
follows: give people choices between safe and risky lotteries, where the safe lotteries are 
certain amounts of money, and the risky lotteries are a 50:50 chance of -y/+x either side of 
the certain amount of money in the safe lottery. For each lottery pair, x > y so that the 
expected value of the risky lottery is slightly larger than the value of the safe lottery. Across a 
set of lottery pairs, the value of the safe prize varies, but x and y are held constant. The idea 
behind this test of the calibration puzzle is to regard the safe lottery as “lab wealth,” and then 
see if subjects are risk averse as one varies lab wealth. For example, suppose -y/+x = -
$10/+$15, then consider two binary choices: one where the safe lottery is $20 and another 
where the safe lottery is $100. The subject then makes two choices: take $20 for certain, or 
take a 50:50 chance of $10 or $35; and take $100 for certain, or take a 50:50 chance of $90 or 
$115. The Hansson-Rabin premiss is that one gets risk aversion in both cases, with a majority 
of people picking the safe lottery. We used 6 lottery pairs from the implementation of the CS 
design in Harrison, Lau, Ross and Swarthout [2017]: 3 pairs where -y/+x = -R60/+R70 and 
the safe options were R120, R320, and R520; and 3 pairs where -y/+x = -R30/+R40 and the 
safe options were R60, R340, and R540. 
 
HMS designed lotteries to test the reduction of compound lotteries (ROCL) axiom, 
which states that a decision-maker is indifferent between a multi-stage compound lottery and 
the actuarially-equivalent simple lottery where the probabilities of the stages of the 
compound lottery have been multiplied out. Given a simple (S) lottery and compound (C) 
lottery, HMS create an actuarially-equivalent (AE) lottery from a two-stage C lottery by 
multiplying out the probabilities of the two-stages, and then construct three pairs of lotteries: 
a S-C pair, a S-AE pair, and an AE-C pair. They used probabilities drawn from {0, ¼, ½, ¾, 
1} and final prizes of {$0, $10, $20, $35, $70}. The compound lotteries were created using a 
“double or nothing” (DON) procedure so the first-stage prizes in a compound lottery were 
drawn from {$5, $10, $17.5, $35}. The second-stage DON procedure then provides the set of 
final prizes above, which is either $0 or double the stakes of the first stage.  
 
Most of the HMS compound lotteries used a conditional version of DON, where the 
initial lottery triggered the DON procedure only if a particular outcome was realised in the 
initial lottery. For example, consider the compound lottery formed by an initial lottery that 
pays $10 and $20 with equal probability. The DON stage is reached if the outcome of the 
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initial lottery is $10. Then, in the subsequent DON lottery, the subject has an equal chance of 
winning $20 (i.e., double $10) or $0 (i.e., nothing). Alternatively, if the realised outcome of 
the initial lottery is $20, the DON stage is not triggered, and the subject earns $20. Figure 2 in 
HMS [p. 35] shows a tree representation of this compound lottery and the corresponding 
actuarially-equivalent simple lottery. The benefit of using a conditional DON lottery is that it 
allows one to obtain better coverage of the MM triangle relative to unconditional DON (see 
p. 35-36 of HMS for more details). This allows for variation in both prizes and probability 
distributions so that one can identify source-dependent preferences that take into account 
attitudes toward variability in prizes and variability in probabilities. We used 30 lottery pairs 
from the HMS design: 15 S-C pairs and 15 S-AE pairs. Hence we have a data-based metric, 
between 0 and 15, for each subject’s consistency with the ROCL axiom. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
In this appendix we estimate the SDU model (9) in the main text under the 
assumptions that EUT characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is 
exponential. We then analyse the atemporal risk preference data and the time preference data 
to determine whether RDU, as opposed to EUT, better characterises choice under atemporal 
risk and whether there is statistically significant evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. 
We find statistically significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting which has an 
economically significant impact on estimates of the power utility function parameter r and 
the exponential discount rate. In addition, we find evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
which has an economically significant effect on estimates of the long-term discounting 
parameter δ.  
 
Table C1 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
EUT, Exponential Discounting 
Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 
  Estimate 
Atemporal Risk Preferences 
Power function parameter (r) 0.409*** 
 (0.019) 
Error (μ) 0.167*** 
  (0.007) 
Time Preferences 
Discounting parameter (δ) 0.782*** 
 (0.062) 
Error (υ) 0.360*** 
  (0.062) 
Intertemporal Risk Preferences 
Power function parameter (ρ) -1.043*** 
 (0.290) 
Error (ψ) 0.312*** 
  (0.021) 
N 48640 
log-likelihood -28973.300 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table C1 presents estimates of the SDU model (9) under the assumptions that EUT 
characterises choice under atemporal risk and that discounting is exponential. As discussed in 
the main text, the estimate of the intertemporal risk preference parameter ρ = -1.043 implies a 
high level of intertemporal risk aversion. 
 
Table C2 presents estimates of an RDU model with a power utility function and the 
Prelec PWF. The estimate of φ = 0.629 is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001) which gives the 
PWF an inverse-S shape form. The estimate of r under the RDU model is statistically 
significantly higher than the estimate of r under the EUT model (p < 0.001), implying that it 
is necessary to estimate time preference models jointly with a RDU model of atemporal risk 
preferences. 
 
Table C2 
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  EUT RDU 
Power function parameter (r) 0.408*** 0.553*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
PWF parameter (φ)  0.629*** 
  (0.020) 
PWF parameter (η)  1.020*** 
  (0.031) 
Error (μ) 0.167*** 0.145*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
N 23040 23040 
log-likelihood -15030,136 -14696,023 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
While the sample as a whole is better characterised by RDU than by EUT, this does 
not imply that every person in the sample probability weights and, therefore, departs from 
EUT. Figure C1 shows the results from an individual-level analysis where we estimate EUT 
and RDU specifications for each subject and then test whether ω(p) = p in the RDU model. 
Using a 5% level of statistical significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ω(p) = p for 
57% of the sample, implying that at least half of the people in our study are better 
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characterised by EUT than RDU. However, the remaining 43% of the sample exhibits 
statistically significant evidence of nonlinear probability weighting. Hence it is necessary to 
take this probability weighting into account when drawing inferences about time preferences 
and intertemporal risk preferences at the level of the sample of subjects. 
 
 
Figure C1: Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU 
 
Table C3 presents estimates of two exponential discounting models. Model 1 assumes 
that EUT and a power utility function characterise choice under atemporal risk whereas 
Model 2 assumes RDU with a power utility function and the Prelec PWF. The estimate of the 
long-term discounting parameter δ is statistically significantly higher under the RDU model 
relative to the EUT model (p < 0.001), which highlights the way in which atemporal risk 
preference estimates propagate into estimates of discounting parameters. 
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Table C3 
Exponential Discounting Function ML Estimates 
EUT and RDU, Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  EUT RDU 
Power function parameter (r) 0.410*** 0.553*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) 
PWF parameter (φ)  0.629***  
 (0.020) 
PWF parameter (η)  1.021*** 
 
 (0.031) 
Discounting parameter (δ) 0.785*** 1.192*** 
 (0.063) (0.101) 
Risk error (μ) 0.167*** 0.145*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Time error (ν) 0.362*** 1.106*** 
  (0.062) (0.199) 
N 38400 38400 
log-likelihood -23681,626 -23345,72 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table C4 shows the statistically and economically significant influence of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting on estimates of the long-term discounting parameter δ. Under the 
quasi-hyperbolic model, there is a sharp drop in the value of a reward if it is not available 
immediately but this drop asymptotes toward the long-term discounting parameter δ over 
time. In the exponential model, by contrast, the discount rate δ does not vary over time and 
remains at the far higher level of 1.192. 
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Table C4 
Discounting Function ML Estimates 
Rank-Dependent Utility, Homogenous Preferences 
 Model 1 Model 3 
  Exponential Quasi-Hyperbolic 
Power function parameter (r) 0.553*** 0.541*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
PWF parameter (φ) 0.629*** 0.632*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
PWF parameter (η) 1.021*** 1.012*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
Discounting parameter (δ) 1.192*** 0.885*** 
 (0.101) (0.073) 
Discounting parameter (β)  0.960*** 
  (0.003) 
Risk error (μ) 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Time error (ν) 1.106*** 1.013*** 
  (0.199) (0.176) 
N 38400 38400 
log-likelihood -23345,72 -22939,946 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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APPENDIX D 
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER] 
 
In this appendix we present results from the SDU model estimated jointly with a RDU 
model, power utility function, and Prelec PWF for choice under atemporal risk, and a quasi-
hyperbolic discounting function. We allow the parameters of the SDU model to vary as a 
linear function of demographics, socio-economic characteristics, and three measures of 
smoking behaviour: smoking status (Table D1); smoking intensity, measured by the number 
of cigarettes smoked per day (Table D3); and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores 
on the FTCD (Table D4). These latter two tables are split according to gender given the 
historical differences in smoking prevalence between men and women, and the economically 
and statistically significant differences in their intertemporal risk preferences. We also 
present atemporal risk preference results in Table D2 to corroborate the discussion in the 
main text that there are no substantive differences in the atemporal risk preferences of men 
and women as a function of smoking intensity. 
 
Table D1 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 
Heterogenous Preferences 
 Model 
  Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)   
Age -0.002 0.001 
White 0.010 0.020 
Male 0.008 0.016 
Financial situation 0.010 0.009 
Staff member 0.020 0.026 
Ex-smoker 0.003 0.032 
Smoker 0.028 0.019 
Constant 0.526*** 0.041 
PWF parameter (φ)   
Age 0.000 0.003 
White 0.087* 0.051 
Male 0.137*** 0.044 
Financial situation 0.009 0.020 
Staff member 0.036 0.075 
Ex-smoker 0.026 0.072 
Smoker 0.013 0.043 
Constant 0.596*** 0.088 
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Table D1 (Continued) 
 Model 
  Estimate Std error 
PWF parameter (η)   
Age 0.003 0.004 
White -0.018 0.066 
Male -0.080 0.058 
Financial situation 0.069** 0.032 
Staff member -0.118 0.092 
Ex-smoker 0.172 0.107 
Smoker 0.039 0.061 
Constant 0.823*** 0.124 
Discounting parameter (β)   
Age 0.000 0.000 
White 0.014** 0.006 
Male -0.002 0.005 
Financial situation 0.001 0.003 
Staff member 0.003 0.006 
Ex-smoker -0.005 0.009 
Smoker -0.007 0.005 
Constant 0.970*** 0.012 
Discounting parameter (δ)   
Age 0.000 0.005 
White -0.254** 0.100 
Male 0.020 0.096 
Financial situation -0.211*** 0.061 
Staff member -0.186 0.134 
Ex-smoker 0.111 0.143 
Smoker 0.356*** 0.130 
Constant 1.521*** 0.230 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)   
Age 0.000 0.027 
White -0.569 0.500 
Male 0.841** 0.382 
Financial situation -0.611** 0.261 
Staff member 1.064 0.688 
Ex-smoker -1.958* 1.180 
Smoker -0.288 0.411 
Constant 0.537 0.832 
Error terms   
μ 0.140*** 0.005 
υ 0.761*** 0.135 
ψ 0.275*** 0.023 
N 47310  
log-likelihood -26859.893   
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table D2 
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error 
Power function parameter (r)     
Age -0.003 0.005 -0.010*** 0.004 
White -0.070 0.075 -0.009 0.069 
Financial situation 0.036 0.041 0.020 0.030 
Staff member 0.104 0.123 0.211* 0.122 
Number of cigarettes -0.003 0.007 0.010 0.007 
Constant 0.605*** 0.138 0.653*** 0.115 
PWF parameter (φ)     
Age 0.008* 0.004 0.003 0.003 
White 0.099 0.069 0.061 0.060 
Financial situation -0.040 0.029 0.014 0.026 
Staff member -0.021 0.096 -0.035 0.083 
Number of cigarettes -0.014*** 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Constant 0.623*** 0.105 0.442*** 0.112 
PWF parameter (η)     
Age 0.016* 0.010 -0.008 0.007 
White -0.095 0.079 0.029 0.141 
Financial situation 0.013 0.050 0.109** 0.048 
Staff member -0.145 0.156 0.065 0.140 
Number of cigarettes -0.002 0.006 0.008 0.012 
Constant 0.608** 0.256 0.964*** 0.167 
Error (μ)     
Constant 0.128*** 0.007 0.157*** 0.009 
N 9900  12510  
log-likelihood -6269.601  -7901.332  
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table D3 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day 
 Model 
  Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)   
Age -0.002 0.001 
White 0.005 0.019 
Male 0.007 0.016 
Financial situation 0.012 0.008 
Staff member 0.018 0.025 
Number of cigarettes 0.004** 0.002 
Constant 0.522*** 0.040 
PWF parameter (φ)   
Age 0.000 0.003 
White 0.094* 0.050 
Male 0.137*** 0.044 
Financial situation 0.006 0.020 
Staff member 0.021 0.073 
Number of cigarettes -0.003 0.004 
Constant 0.611*** 0.086 
PWF parameter (η)   
Age 0.003 0.005 
White -0.004 0.067 
Male -0.086 0.059 
Financial situation 0.066** 0.033 
Staff member -0.119 0.093 
Number of cigarettes 0.004 0.005 
Constant 0.830*** 0.126 
Discounting parameter (β)   
Age -0.000 0.000 
White 0.014** 0.006 
Male -0.002 0.004 
Financial situation 0.002 0.003 
Staff member 0.003 0.006 
Number of cigarettes -0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.967*** 0.011 
Discounting parameter (δ)   
Age -0.001 0.005 
White -0.271*** 0.101 
Male 0.027 0.097 
Financial situation -0.205*** 0.059 
Staff member -0.168 0.135 
Number of cigarettes 0.040*** 0.012 
Constant 1.535*** 0.221 
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Table D3 (Continued) 
 Model 
  Estimate Std error 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)   
Age -0.004 0.029 
White -0.740 0.550 
Male 0.914** 0.403 
Financial situation -0.572** 0.273 
Staff member 1.013 0.678 
Number of cigarettes -0.013 0.041 
Constant 0.326 0.782 
Error terms   
μ 0.141*** 0.005 
υ 0.751*** 0.128 
ψ 0.280*** 0.024 
N 47310  
log-likelihood -26883.870   
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table D4 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
RDU, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting 
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)     
Age 0.002 0.004 -0.003** 0.002 
White -0.030 0.039 0.068 0.059 
Financial situation -0.013 0.016 -0.006 0.014 
Staff member 0.018 0.051 0.054 0.042 
FTCD score 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.008 
Constant 0.521*** 0.106 0.570*** 0.076 
PWF parameter (φ)     
Age 0.014 0.015 -0.003 0.005 
White 0.198 0.147 0.057 0.083 
Financial situation -0.134** 0.057 0.025 0.043 
Staff member -0.153 0.191 -0.032 0.116 
FTCD score -0.049** 0.022 -0.007 0.014 
Constant 0.871*** 0.298 0.806*** 0.145 
PWF parameter (η)     
Age -0.017 0.028 0.001 0.010 
White -0.143 0.133 -0.077 0.192 
Financial situation 0.118* 0.069 0.135** 0.062 
Staff member -0.087 0.222 -0.096 0.197 
FTCD score 0.064** 0.027 0.003 0.039 
Constant 0.918 0.574 0.742*** 0.258 
Discounting parameter (β)     
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
White 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.011 
Financial situation -0.004 0.007 -0.004 0.004 
Staff member -0.001 0.014 0.000 0.015 
FTCD score 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Constant 0.970*** 0.018 0.979*** 0.014 
Discounting parameter (δ)     
Age 0.035 0.039 -0.002 0.011 
White -0.334 0.283 0.130 0.374 
Financial situation -0.192 0.167 -0.098 0.144 
Staff member -0.109 0.449 -0.515* 0.289 
FTCD score 0.078 0.065 -0.006 0.044 
Constant 0.832 0.949 1.535*** 0.456 
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Table D4 (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)     
Age 0.008 0.077 0.022 0.083 
White 0.259 0.930 1.232 1.538 
Financial situation -0.994** 0.497 -0.656 0.555 
Staff member 0.809 0.907 0.463 1.876 
FTCD score -0.435** 0.213 0.409 0.403 
Constant 3.040** 1.493 -1.177 2.876 
Error terms     
μ 0.131*** 0.011 0.146*** 0.014 
υ 0.606** 0.252 0.439** 0.178 
ψ 0.224*** 0.047 0.221*** 0.063 
N 9120  8170  
log-likelihood -4797.759  -4401.497   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table D5 
Atemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error 
Power function parameter (r)     
Age 0.046 0.092 -0.017 0.014 
White 0.069 0.196 0.130 0.120 
Financial situation -0.067 0.099 -0.024 0.052 
Staff member -0.237 0.580 0.456 0.468 
FTCD score -0.069* 0.040 0.033 0.030 
Constant -0.056 1.743 0.824** 0.348 
PWF parameter (φ)     
Age 0.028 0.035 0.010* 0.005 
White 0.127 0.122 0.115 0.087 
Financial situation -0.098* 0.052 0.019 0.044 
Staff member -0.267 0.223 -0.202 0.153 
FTCD score -0.038* 0.021 -0.016 0.017 
Constant 0.343 0.760 0.390** 0.174 
PWF parameter (η)     
Age 0.050 0.208 -0.001 0.014 
White -0.031 0.256 0.053 0.191 
Financial situation 0.063 0.108 0.116* 0.062 
Staff member -0.475 1.229 0.107 0.306 
FTCD score 0.003 0.028 0.032 0.057 
Constant -0.262 4.244 0.678* 0.369 
Error (μ)     
Constant 0.132*** 0.020 0.149*** 0.013 
N 4320  3870  
log-likelihood -2687.46  -2440.704  
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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APPENDIX E 
[ONLINE WORKING PAPER] 
 
The tables in this appendix complement those presented in Appendix D because we 
estimate the SDU model jointly with an EUT model and an exponential discounting function. 
We allow the parameters of the SDU model to vary as a linear function of demographics, 
socio-economic characteristics, and three measures of smoking behaviour: smoking status 
(Table E1); smoking intensity, measured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day (Table 
E2); and smoking severity, measured by smokers’ scores on the FTCD (Table E3). These 
latter two tables are split according to gender given the historical differences in smoking 
prevalence between men and women, and the economically and statistically significant 
differences in their intertemporal risk preferences. 
 
Table E1 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
EUT, Exponential Discounting 
Heterogenous Preferences 
 Model 
  Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)   
Age -0.002 0.001 
White 0.010 0.018 
Male 0.019 0.015 
Financial situation 0.002 0.008 
Staff member 0.024 0.025 
Ex-smoker -0.005 0.029 
Smoker 0.033* 0.018 
Constant 0.429*** 0.039 
Discounting parameter (δ)   
Age 0.000 0.004 
White -0.250*** 0.090 
Male 0.033 0.083 
Financial situation -0.160*** 0.050 
Staff member -0.140 0.118 
Ex-smoker 0.097 0.130 
Smoker 0.318*** 0.107 
Constant 1.268*** 0.197 
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Table E1 (Continued) 
 Model 
  Estimate 
Std 
error 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)   
Age 0.006 0.033 
White -0.915 0.670 
Male 0.918* 0.487 
Financial situation -0.712** 0.332 
Staff member 1.207 0.853 
Ex-smoker -2.274 1.528 
Smoker -0.275 0.525 
Constant 0.213 1.106 
Error terms   
μ 0.165*** 0.007 
υ 0.311*** 0.056 
ψ 0.306*** 0.023 
N 47310  
log-likelihood -27526.615   
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table E2 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
EUT, Exponential Discounting 
Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes Smoked per Day 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate 
Std 
error Estimate 
Std 
error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)     
Age -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
White -0.020 0.027 0.015 0.023 
Financial situation -0.005 0.011 0.009 0.010 
Staff member 0.038 0.046 0.017 0.028 
Number of cigarettes 0.005** 0.002 0.005* 0.002 
Constant 0.540*** 0.071 0.345*** 0.043 
Discounting parameter (δ)     
Age 0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.004 
White -0.417** 0.179 -0.170* 0.094 
Financial situation -0.242*** 0.091 -0.114** 0.058 
Staff member -0.154 0.254 -0.116 0.122 
Number of cigarettes 0.049** 0.019 0.026*** 0.010 
Constant 1.702*** 0.368 1.020*** 0.222 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)     
Age -0.034 0.033 0.037 0.059 
White -0.235 0.378 
-
23.331*** 3.991 
Financial situation -0.228 0.203 -1.207* 0.706 
Staff member 0.911 0.681 1.443 1.652 
Number of cigarettes -0.053* 0.029 0.115 0.078 
Constant 1.344 0.921 -1.014 1.605 
Error terms     
μ 0.155*** 0.009 0.176*** 0.011 
υ 0.523*** 0.159 0.191*** 0.039 
ψ 0.233*** 0.023 0.351*** 0.030 
N 20900  26410  
log-likelihood 
-
11933.148   
-
15477.688   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table E3 
Intertemporal Risk Preference ML Estimates 
EUT, Exponential Discounting 
Smoking Severity: Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Male Female 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Atemporal risk preference parameter (r)     
Age 0.005 0.005 -0.004** 0.002 
White -0.015 0.037 0.067 0.059 
Financial situation -0.029** 0.012 -0.012 0.014 
Staff member 0.011 0.051 0.045 0.042 
FTCD score 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008 
Constant 0.449*** 0.118 0.483*** 0.078 
Discounting parameter (δ)     
Age 0.031 0.040 -0.004 0.008 
White -0.340 0.255 0.083 0.273 
Financial situation -0.174 0.140 -0.066 0.090 
Staff member -0.022 0.455 -0.344* 0.204 
FTCD score 0.054 0.056 -0.007 0.034 
Constant 0.893 0.931 1.287*** 0.379 
Intertemporal risk preference parameter (ρ)     
Age -0.039 0.097 0.048 0.133 
White -0.411 1.274 1.407 1.910 
Financial situation -0.901** 0.391 -0.623 0.772 
Staff member 0.942 1.217 0.120 2.750 
FTCD score -0.376* 0.194 0.608 0.598 
Constant 3.490* 1.948 -2.856 4.622 
Error terms     
μ 0.169*** 0.014 0.165*** 0.014 
υ 0.328** 0.147 0.168*** 0.051 
ψ 0.254*** 0.050 0.250*** 0.068 
N 9120  8170  
log-likelihood -5006.841   -4513.919   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
